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Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter Overview
The first chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses incentive contract
framing and Section 1.3 introduces principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.
Section 1.4 describes this dissertation’s contributions.

Incentive Contract Framing
The design of incentive compensation plans is critical to a company’s success. An
incentive contract can be framed as either a bonus that rewards agents for achieving
certain performance goals or as a penalty that decreases compensation if agents fail to
meet performance goals.1 The effects of bonuses and penalties on managers’ effort
remains unclear because prior research has found mixed results.
Conventional economic theory suggests that when two contracts are economically
equivalent, agents should be indifferent when choosing between them. “Economically
equivalent” means the monetary payoff is the same whether the firm frames the contract
as a bonus or a penalty. For example, a bonus contract that pays a salary of $10,000 and
a bonus of $1,000 if the performance target is reached is equivalent to a penalty contract
that pays a salary of $11,000 and a penalty of $1,000 if the performance target is not
achieved. The two contracts are economically equivalent because both contracts pay

1

Although bonus contracts are more common than penalty contracts, interest in and use of contracts that
include elements of both penalties and bonuses or “bonus-malus” contracts” is becoming more common.
The implementation of bonus-malus contracts is increasing as a result of “clawback provisions” that target
excessive CEO compensation. For example, UBS has used a bonus-malus structure for all executive cash
awards since 2009 (Christ et al. 2012).
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$11,000 if the performance target is attained and $10,000 if the performance target is not
achieved.
Research shows that the framing of incentive contracts can change agents’
preferences. Luft (1994) studied the role of decision-framing on preferences for bonus
and penalty contracts and found that agents preferred bonus contracts to economically
equivalent penalty contracts. Luft (1994) suggests that agents preferred bonus contracts
due to loss aversion, which refers to the idea that people tend to be more sensitive to
losses than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Agent preference for bonus contracts is
also consistent with what is observed in practice where bonus contracts are more
prevalent than penalty contracts (Christ et al. 2012; Frederickson and Waller 2005;
Hannan et al. 2005; Luft 1994).
In a contract setting where the contract specifies the payout for each possible
outcome, penalty contracts induce more effort than bonus contracts (Hannan et al. 2005).
Hannan et al. (2005) found that even though agents preferred bonus contracts to penalty
contracts, agent effort was higher under a penalty contract than an economically
equivalent bonus contract. Using the same explanation as Luft (1994), Hannan et al.
(2005) concludes that loss aversion caused agents to expend more effort under the
penalty contract than under the bonus contract. Agents were more averse to paying a
penalty than not receiving a bonus so they chose a higher effort level under the penalty
contract to avoid paying the penalty (Hannan et al. 2005).
Hannan et al. (2005) call for additional research to understand the full range of
costs and benefits associated with each type of contract. Because agent effort was higher

2

under penalty contracts, offering a bonus contract gives up the benefit of this increased
effort. Therefore, it is no longer clear that offering a bonus contract maximizes firm
profit (Hannan et al. 2005). A more comprehensive explanation is also needed to better
understand the conditions under which firms should use bonus contracts versus penalty
contracts. The figure below illustrates the Hannan et al. (2005) model:
Figure 1: Hannan et al. (2005) Model

Christ et al. (2012) examined the effect of contract framing on effort in a contract
setting with principal discretion. A contract setting with principal discretion allows
principals to use their discretion to determine agent pay (Christ et al. 2012). Christ et al.
(2012) found that when contracts included principal discretion, agent effort on a
subsequent task that was not under a contract was greater under bonus contracts relative
to penalty contracts because bonus contracts induced a more trusting environment.
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The figure below illustrates the Christ et al. (2012) model:
Figure 2: Christ et al. (2012) Model

It is unclear whether and how the Hannan et al. (2005) and the Christ et al. (2012)
models fit together. Christ et al. (2012) call for additional research to analyze the various
mechanisms through which contract framing may influence agent behavior. Christ et al.
(2012) suggest that future research examine when the effect of one mechanism might
outweigh the others and when managers should implement a bonus versus a penalty
contract. Understanding how the models fit together will not only improve principals’ use
of contract framing but will also help principals to maximize firm profit (Hannan et al.
2005).

4

Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation
Prior literature on contract framing assumes a contract setting without principal
discretion. A contract setting without principal discretion details the duties of principals
to provide compensation for each potential future outcome (Christ et al. 2012). In
practice, however, most contracts allow principals to use their discretion to pay agents.
Incentive contracts with principal discretion are more common than incentive contracts
without principal discretion (Prendergast 1999; Bol 2008).
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation means that principals use
subjective judgment to assess agent performance. Principal discretion may be based on
personal impressions, feelings and options, rather than on external facts (Bol 2008). By
definition, the correctness of principal discretion cannot be determined by a third party.
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation is commonly introduced with
the use of ex post discretional adjustments based on factors other than the performance
measures specified ex ante (Gibbs et al. 2004; Bol 2008). Other ways of introducing
principal discretion are by using subjective performance measures and by allowing for ex
post flexibility in the weighting of objective performance measures (Bol 2008). Principal
discretion in agent performance evaluation falls onto a continuum. Principals who allow
for ex post adjustments to objective performance measures may use less discretion than
principals who combine all three types of discretion. The type and amount of principal
discretion depends on the contracting problem (Hoppe and Moers 2011).
Most research on principal discretion is based on agency theory. The main
purpose of principal-agent models is to describe the “optimal contract” (Bol 2008). In
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most situations, agents have better information than principals because complete
observation of agent actions is not possible. To address this problem, principals may link
agent pay to performance. However, agents must bear risk due to imperfect performance
measures. The optimal contract balances the need to motivate unobservable agent effort
with the need to minimize the risk to agents (Bol 2008).
Principal discretion compensates for imperfect performance measures such as
objective performance measures, which can be noisy. Objective measures do not account
for all dimensions of agent effort and can be contaminated by uncontrollable events (Bol
2008). The use of discretion improves contracting (Homstron and Milgrom 1991; Budde
2007) and allows principals to use all relevant information known at the time of the agent
performance evaluation instead of the limited information available from objective
measures.
However, the costs of principal discretion must be considered along with its
benefits. The biggest problem with principal discretion is that discretion allows principal
self-interest to bias agent evaluations (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Bol 2008; Bol 2011).
Because contracts with principal discretion are not legally enforceable, principals may
even renege on promises to pay agents. The possibility of reneging causes agents to
withhold effort out of concern that their effort will not be rewarded (Bol 2008).
Principal discretion may also lead to inaccurate assessments (Bol 2008).
Inaccurate assessments can lead to lower productivity because agents will not increase
their effort when they fear that their effort will not be rewarded. Inaccuracies blur the link
between pay and performance which then decreases the effectiveness of the incentive
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plan. Bol (2008) showed a negative relationship between rating inaccuracies and agent
incentives and that centrality bias negatively impacts agent performance. Centrality bias
is the tendency to compress performance ratings, which results in less variance in ratings
than is justified by variance in performance (Bol 2011).
Principal discretion also introduces uncertainty about which measures will be
used to assess performance. This can lead to confusion about how agents can improve
performance. Agents will not be motivated to increase effort unless they understand how
performance improvements can lead to increased reward. Ittner et al. (2003) examined
the introduction of a compensation plan with principal discretion. They found that
discretion in the new plan led agents to complain about the uncertainty in the criteria used
to determine rewards.
Prior literature on principal discretion in agent performance evaluation focuses on
environmental conditions when principal discretion is more common (Hoppe and Moers
2009; Murphy and Oyer 2003) and the specific ways that principal discretion is used in
practice (Bol et al. 2015; Bol and Smith 2011; Hoppe and Moers 2009; Ittner et al. 2003).
Few studies, however, examine the effects of principal discretion on agents (Gibbs et al.
2004; Bol 2008) with the exception of Bol (2008), which shows that principal discretion
negatively impacts agent performance due to centrality bias.

This Study
This study develops and validates a theoretical model of the effects of incentive
contract framing on agent effort based on the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012)
models. The study also uses the model to examine whether and how principal discretion
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in agent performance evaluation interacts with incentive contract framing. The effect of
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation is unclear because the effect of
principal discretion depends on the degree to which agents interpret its use as a signal of
trust. The study hypothesizes that the interaction of principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation and incentive contract framing has an asymmetric effect on agent
effort. More specifically, principal discretion in agent performance evaluation and
incentive contract framing increases agent effort under bonus contracts but decreases
agent effort under penalty contracts.
The two independent variables, incentive contract frame and principal discretion
in agent performance evaluation, are each manipulated at two levels. Contract frame is
manipulated with either a positively framed contract that rewarded agents for meeting or
exceeding the performance target or a negatively framed contract that penalized agents
for failing to meet the performance target. The study maintained monetary equivalence
across conditions to isolate the framing effects. Principal discretion in agent performance
evaluation is manipulated by either allowing or not allowing principals to adjust the
performance target that determined whether agents received the reward or paid the
penalty. This manipulation is consistent with practice where firms allow principals to
make ex post discretionary adjustments to performance measures in incentive contracting
(Bol 2008).
The study examines the effect of incentive contract framing and principal
discretion in agent performance evaluation on effort using a computer-based experiment
with two tasks adapted from Christ et al. (2012). The first task, the task under contract,
manipulates both independent variables and uses performance-based pay as defined by
8

the experimental condition. The study’s second task, the task not under contract, is not
governed by an incentive contract and measures the trust effect from the first task. The
second task allows the principal to have complete discretion over the agent’s pay. The
manipulation of incentive contract frame and principal discretion in the first task is
expected to affect the results in the second task.
The two primary dependent variables are agent effort on the task under contract
(the first task) and agent effort on the task not under contract (the second task). Agent
effort is represented by the amount of points agents choose to invest in each task. This
costly choice meets the definition of effort found in prior research (Fehr et al. 1993). The
study also adds in the other factors from the previous two models for the supplemental
analysis: perceived fairness and expected disappointment from Hannan et al. (2005) and
perceived intrusion, perceived autonomy, signal of questioning competence, signal of
questioning integrity, perceived trust, and reciprocal trust from Christ et al. (2012). The
study measures these items using agents’ responses to questions in the experimental
instrument.
The combined model suggests that the interaction of principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation with incentive contract frame will decrease (increase) effort
under a penalty (bonus) contract frame. The use of the penalty (bonus) contract frame
with principal discretion will lead to higher (lower) levels of expected disappointment
and perceived intrusion and lower (higher) levels of perceived fairness and perceived
autonomy than the use of the penalty (bonus) contract frame without principal discretion.
These effects will lead to lower (higher) levels of trust, effort and performance under the
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penalty (bonus) contract frame with principal discretion than under the penalty (bonus)
contract frame without principal discretion.
Results do not support these predictions. The use of the penalty (bonus) contract
frame with principal discretion did not decrease (increase) effort. The use of the penalty
contract (bonus) contract frame with principal discretion did not lead to significantly
higher (lower) levels of expected disappointment, perceived intrusion and perceived loss
of autonomy and lower (higher) levels of perceived fairness than the use of the penalty
(bonus) contract frame without principal discretion. Therefore, there were no significant
differences in levels of trust, effort and performance between the penalty (bonus) contract
frame with principal discretion and the penalty (bonus) contract frame without principal
discretion.
This study, however, finds an interaction between principal discretion and
contract frame. Specifically, principal discretion increases perceived fairness under a
penalty contract frame but not under a bonus contract frame. The results also show that
when a penalty contract includes principal discretion, there is no significant difference in
perceived fairness between a bonus contract and a penalty contract.
This study extends prior research by showing that perceived fairness brings
together the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models. Similar to Hannan et
al. (2005), this study finds that effort was greater under a penalty contract than under a
bonus contract in a setting without discretion. Also, similar to Christ et al. (2012), this
study shows that bonus contracts create a more trusting environment than penalty
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contracts. Contrary to prior research, however, this study finds that perceived fairness
explains how contract frame affects effort and the trust environment.
This study provides several important contributions to academic literature and
practice. First, this study reconciles the theory and findings of Hannan et al. (2005) and
Christ et al. (2012). Because prior contract framing studies theorized alternative
mediating paths, it was unclear how incentive contract framing shapes agent beliefs. By
bringing together the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models, this study
helps academics to better understand the underlying mechanisms for how contract
framing influences agent beliefs.
Second, the study extends the principal discretion in compensation contracting
literature. Prior literature on principal discretion focuses on the benefits and costs of
principal discretion without examining whether principal discretion changes the effects of
incentive contract framing. The results of this study show that principal discretion in
performance evaluation significantly improves the perceived fairness of penalty
contracts.
Third, this study is the first to analyze whether and how principals’ use of
discretionary adjustments to performance measures interacts with incentive contract
framing. Prior literature has just begun to examine the different types of principal
discretion in incentive contracting (Bol 2008; Hoppe and Moers 2011). Christ et al.
(2012) introduces a form of principal discretion that is not based on performance
measures. However, in practice, principals use discretion to make ex post adjustments to
performance measures. Prior literature shows that these two types of principal discretion
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have different determinants (Bol 2008; Hoppe and Moers 2011). Therefore, it is
important to understand whether and how principals’ use of discretionary adjustments to
performance measures changes the contract framing effects on agent behavior.
Fourth, the results of the study are important for managers who design and
implement incentive contracts. The results of the study suggest that managers who design
incentive contracts may want to consider both the use of principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation and contract frame (bonus vs. penalty). The study finds that the
use of ex post discretionary adjustments to performance measures significantly improves
the perceived fairness of penalty contracts.
The next chapter reviews the relevant contract framing literature with a focus on
Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) and the literature that examines principal
discretion in agent performance evaluation; Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses; Chapter 4
details the research methods used to test the hypotheses; Chapter 5 presents data analysis
and the results and Chapter 6 summarizes the results, the study’s limitations and future
research directions.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents a brief summary of the background literature which is
organized into two categories. Section 2.2 summarizes the literature on the effects of
incentive contract framing. This section includes a detailed review of Hannan et al.
(2005) and Christ et al. (2012). Section 2.3 looks at both the benefits and costs of
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation. Section 2.4 concludes with a
summary of the chapter.

Effects of Incentive Contract Framing
2.2.1

Framing
“Framing” refers to the wording of a task that can describe the judgment or

decision either in positive or negative terms (Bonner 2008). Tversky and Kahneman
(1981) introduced “risky choice” framing with their “Asian disease problem.” The “risky
choice” frame asked individuals to make a choice between a risky or riskless alternative.
Both alternatives were described either in positive or negative terms. Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) found a “choice reversal.” The majority of individuals chose the
riskless alternative when given the positively framed version of the task but chose the
risky alternative when given the negatively framed version of the task. Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) explained this choice reversal with their theory called “prospect
theory.” Prospect theory predicts that individuals are risk averse in choices involving
gains and risk seeking in choices involving losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
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2.2.2

Preference for Bonus Contracts vs. Penalty Contracts
In practice, most incentive contracts are framed as bonus contracts rather than

penalty contracts (Luft 1994; Frederickson and Waller 2005; Hannan et al. 2005; Church
et al. 2008; Christ et al. 2012; Brink and Rankin 2013). The first study to investigate this
topic was Luft (1994). Using an experiment where participants chose between a contract
with a flat rate and a series of bonus or penalty incentive contracts, Luft (1994) found that
individuals preferred bonus contracts to penalty contracts. The study concluded that
principals would have to pay agents more to accept a penalty contract than a bonus
contract.
Luft (1994) proposed three possible explanations for the study’s results. First,
agents preferred bonus to penalty contracts due to loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). Because contracts labeled “bonus” aroused a positive “gain” association and
contracts labeled “penalty” aroused a negative “loss” association, agents preferred bonus
contracts. Second, agents associated nonmonetary payoffs with bonus contracts because
contracts labeled a “bonus” had connotations of approval and reward. Third, bonus and
penalty contracts in practice have implicit contract terms: “bonus” implies both a
guaranteed base amount and an additional future payoff and “penalty” implies that the
base amount was uncertain without any future benefit (Luft 1994).
Frederickson and Waller (2005) supported Luft (1994)’s findings that loss
aversion caused agents to prefer bonus contracts to penalty contracts. In an experimental
setting where principals interacted with agents, Frederickson and Waller (2005) showed
that agents in the penalty group demanded higher pay than agents in the bonus group.
The study also found that principals accommodated agents’ loss aversion by increasing
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expected agent pay in the penalty group relative to the bonus group (Frederickson and
Waller 2005).
Brink and Rankin (2013) extended Luft (1994) by testing whether risk preference
and loss aversion justified why agents prefer bonus contracts to penalty contracts. The
study also contributes to prior literature by examining contracts with combinations of
bonus, penalty and clawback incentives. Brink and Rankin (2013) found not only that
loss aversion and risk preferences explained agents’ preferences for bonus contracts but
the study also demonstrated that bonus contracts were preferred to contracts framed as
combinations of bonus and penalty incentives.

2.2.3

Effect of Contract Framing on Effort in a Contract Setting without Principal
Discretion
Several papers examine the effect of contract framing on effort in a contract

setting without principal discretion (Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 2008; Hossain and
List 2012). A contract setting without principal discretion is one that does not allow for
principal discretion because the contract specifies the financial obligations of principals
to agents for each potential future outcome. Consistent with prospect theory’s
predictions and loss aversion, all three studies showed that penalty-framed contracts
motivated higher effort than bonus-framed contracts.
The purpose of Hannan et al. (2005) was to provide an understanding of whether
and how factors underlying agents’ preference for bonus contracts affected agent effort.
Specifically, the study explored the following questions: 1) does agent effort differ under
economically equivalent contracts framed in bonus versus penalty terms and if so, which
type of contract results in higher effort and 2) does expected disappointment or perceived
fairness mediate any effect of contract frame on agent effort (Hannan et al. 2005)?
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The underlying tension for the study came from two opposite predictions. On the
one hand, the theory of reciprocity predicts that agent effort will be greater under bonus
contracts than under penalty contracts. Agents who view bonus contracts as fairer than
penalty contracts will reciprocate by expending more effort under bonus contracts than
under penalty contracts (Hannan et al. 2005). In the study’s post-experimental questions,
Luft (1994) found that agents preferred bonus contracts to penalty contracts because
agents viewed bonus contracts as fairer than penalty contracts.
On the other hand, loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) predicts that agent
effort will be greater under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts. Loss aversion
suggests that individuals experience greater disutility from the perceived loss of having to
pay a penalty than from the perceived foregone gain associated with not receiving an
equivalent bonus (Hannan et al. 2005). Agents who expect to experience greater
disutility will expend more effort to avoid the expected outcome than agents who expect
to experience less disutility. Therefore agents under penalty contracts will expend greater
effort than agents under bonus contracts.
Using an experiment, Hannan et al. (2005) assigned participants to either a bonus
or penalty contract. The participants’ task was to choose an effort level. The study also
asked agents about 1) their degree of expected disappointment about not receiving the
bonus or having to pay the penalty and 2) the fairness of their contract. After responding
to the expected disappointment and fairness questions, participants were given a
description of the contract used in the other condition and were asked whether they
preferred the bonus or the penalty contract (Hannan et al. 2005).
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The answer to Hannan et al. (2005)’s first research question was that although
agents preferred bonus contracts, agent effort was significantly greater under penalty
contracts than under bonus contracts. Due to loss aversion, agents expected to be more
disappointed about having to pay the penalty than about not receiving the bonus. The
greater disappointment resulted in higher agent effort. Therefore, agent effort was greater
under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.
The answer to the study’s second research question was that both expected
disappointment and perceived fairness mediated the effect of contract frame on effort.
However, the expected disappointment effect was stronger than the perceived fairness
effect. The expected disappointment effect was due to loss aversion that made agents
more averse to having to pay the penalty than foregoing an economically equivalent gain.
The perceived fairness effect was due to reciprocity which caused agents under bonus
contracts to choose more effort than agents under penalty contracts because agents
viewed bonus contracts as fairer than penalty contracts.
Using an experiment without principal discretion, Church et al. (2008) examined
the effect of contract frame on effort for a task that led to higher performance with
increased effort. Previous research used a traditional “effort choice” setting that did not
include performance effects. Church et al. (2008) also tested whether contract frame
motivated effort differently in the presence or absence of an effective financial incentive
for performance. Church et al. (2008) found that the penalty-framed contract motivated
higher task performance for agents whose performance fell within the bonus or penalty
range (i.e. where financial incentives were effective in motivating performance).
Performance did not differ based on contract frame for agents whose performance
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resulted in them receiving either the minimum or maximum payment (i.e. where financial
incentives were not effective in motivating performance).
Hossain and List (2012) used a natural field experiment to explore how contract
framing increased productivity in a high-tech Chinese consumer electronics company. In
a contract setting without principal discretion, the study predicted that workers under the
penalty contract would outperform workers under the bonus contract due to loss aversion.
Hossain and List (2012) found that workers under the penalty contract significantly
outperformed workers under the bonus contract.

2.2.4

Effect of Contract Framing on Effort in a Contract Setting with Principal
Discretion
Christ et al. (2012) investigate whether principal discretion affects effort under

bonus contracts relative to penalty contracts. Specifically, the study considered whether
effort would be greater under bonus contracts than under penalty contracts in a contract
setting with principal discretion (Christ et al. 2012). The contract setting allows principal
discretion because the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the agent is
responsible (Christ et al. 2012).
Christ et al. (2012) is important not only because prior literature assumed a
contract setting without principal discretion (Luft 1994; Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al.
2008; Hossain and List 2012) but also because most incentive contracts in practice allow
principals to have discretion over agent compensation (Christ et al. 2012). In a setting
with principal discretion, principal opportunism is possible (Fisher et al. 2005). As a
result of principal opportunism, agent effort depends on agents’ trust in principals (Christ
et al. 2012). If contract frame affects the trust environment, then prior literature
examining the effect of contract frame on effort is incomplete (Christ et al. 2012).
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The study’s experiment manipulated the incentive contract frame as either a
bonus contract or a penalty contract that governed only one of two tasks. This type of
setting is common in practice because most incentive contracts do not include all of the
tasks for which the agent is responsible (Christ et al. 2012). In the first task, principals
paid agents for performance based on either a bonus or penalty incentive contract. In the
second task, principals paid agents based on their discretion rather than an incentive
contract. With principal discretion, trust becomes important in determining agent effort
(Christ et al. 2012).
In contrast to a contract setting without principal discretion, agent effort in a
contract setting with principal discretion was higher under bonus contracts than penalty
contracts. Christ et al. (2012) found that agent effort was higher because bonus contracts
created a more trusting environment than penalty contracts. The positive framing of the
bonus contract signaled the principal’s trust in the agent. This signal increased the
agent’s trust in the principal which led to increased agent effort on the task not governed
by an incentive contract.
Christ et al. (2012) suggest that both contract frame and the use of principal
discretion are important when examining the effects of incentive contracts. The results
also help to explain why bonus contracts are more common than penalty contracts.
Bonus contracts in a contract setting with principal discretion result in higher agent effort
than penalty contracts.
This section has advanced two theories of incentive contract framing that describe
the effects of incentive contract framing on agent effort. First, in a contract setting
without principal discretion, loss aversion explains why penalty contracts elicit greater
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agent effort than bonus contracts. Agents experience greater disutility from the perceived
loss of having to pay a penalty than from the perceived foregone gain associated with an
equivalent bonus (Hannan 2005). Second, in a contract setting with principal discretion,
the agent’s trust in the principal explains why bonus contracts lead to greater agent effort
than penalty contracts (Christ et. al. 2012). Agents interpret the terms of a bonus contract
as a signal of trust which leads to greater effort on tasks not governed by the contract as
compared to penalty contracts.
In practice, most contracts allow principals to use discretion in evaluating agents.
Therefore, the next section examines both the benefits and costs of principal discretion in
agent performance evaluation.

Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation
2.3.1

Benefits of Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation
This section discusses the benefits of introducing principal discretion in agent

performance evaluation. The benefits include: 1) the mitigation of distortions in
incentives 2) agent compensation risk reduction 3) limitation of measure manipulation 4)
motivation to adapt behavior and 5) reduction of perceived unfairness (Bol 2008). First,
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation compensates for inadequate
objective performance measures. Objective performance measures can be inadequate
because objective performance measures cannot account for all dimensions of the agent’s
job (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Discretion allows principals to include aspects of
agent performance in the evaluation that are not quantifiable rather than only those
aspects that are quantifiable.
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Several papers have investigated the role of principal discretion in mitigating
incentive distortions (Bol 2008). Murphy and Oyer (2003) examined the role of
discretion in executive incentive contracts. The study examines the trade-offs firms face
in choosing between imprecise objective measures of individual performance, more
accurate but subjective performance measures and broad firm-wide measures. Using a
proprietary dataset of executive bonus plans, the study found that discretion was used to
adjust for imperfect objective performance measures. Moreover, the study showed that
objective measures do not adequately capture the value of manager performance.
In a study by Gibbs et al. (2005), car dealerships used discretion to reward service
managers for value-enhancing efforts that were not easily quantified in formula contracts.
Service jobs were more difficult to measure than sales jobs because service jobs included
measures such as quality of repairs, timeliness of service and customer satisfaction. Car
dealerships found it too costly to include all of these measures in the formula bonus.
Gibbs et al. (2005) found that using discretion motivated service managers to focus on a
wider range of value-enhancing tasks rather than on only those tasks that could easily be
quantified.
Gibbs et al. (2009) showed that firms used discretion as a response to weaknesses
in available objective performance measures. Their car dealership survey data analyzed
the incentive system for managers of several car dealerships. They found that car
dealerships used incentive systems of multiple performance measures and additional
discretionary bonuses to adjust for weaknesses in the objective performance measures.
Second, principal discretion lowers agent compensation risk (Bol 2008).
Objective performance measures can be noisy due to factors outside the control of agents.
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Noisy performance measures require that principals pay a risk premium to risk-averse
agents. Principals can use discretionary adjustments to noisy performance measures to
filter out the compensation effects of the uncontrollable events.
Hoppe and Moers (2011) showed that boards of directors used discretionary
adjustments to address the contracting problem of risk. Discretionary adjustments were
“the ex ante option to ex post override a formula (Hoppe and Moers 2011).” Hoppe and
Moers (2011) used compensation contract data from SEC proxy statements. Specifically,
the study found that firms used discretionary adjustments to reduce risk by adjusting for
uncontrollable events. The study also found that firms increased their use of
discretionary bonuses as performance measures became noisier.
Using car dealership compensation survey data, Gibbs et al. (2004) examined
whether principals used discretion in awarding bonuses to reduce risk. Risk may be due
to uncontrollable factors such as organizational interdependencies or to uncontrollable
events that increased the difficulty of performance targets. They found that the use of
discretionary bonuses was related to the extent of organizational interdependencies and to
the difficulty of the formula bonus target.
Maas, van Rinsum and Towry (2011) studied the willingness of managers to
obtain additional costly information to better assess individual contributions to the team.
They found that because of concerns for fairness and trust reciprocity, managers used
their discretion to obtain this additional information as the team measure became a
noisier measure of individual performance.
Third, principal discretion reduces measure manipulation (Bol 2008). Objective
measures are susceptible to manipulation (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Ittner et al.
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2003). Because agents know which actions affect objective performance measures,
agents can use this information to their benefit at the expense of the firm. Discretion
allows principals to limit measure manipulation because principals can use their
discretion to punish agents who attempt to manipulate measures. Also principals can use
discretion to make adjustments ex post rather than limit their evaluations to the ex ante
objective performance measures. Knowing this, agents have less incentive to manipulate
objective performance measures.
Several papers address the role of principal discretion in reducing measure
manipulation. Gibbs et al. (2004) was unable to show that the use of discretion was
related to the manipulability of the objective measures. Woods (2012) did not find that
principals were more likely to adjust downward for unexpectedly high objective
performance measures the more manipulable the measure. On the other hand, Gibbs et
al. (2009) found that car dealerships were more likely to use discretion the more
manipulable the performance measure. Gibbs et al. (2009) also showed that car
dealerships weighted more heavily those measures that had the least amount of
manipulation.
Indjejikian and Matejka (2011) demonstrated that firms relied more on
performance evaluation that used principal discretion in determining local managers’
bonuses when those local managers had greater influence over the design of internal
accounting systems. When managers had greater influence over the design of internal
accounting systems, the managers obtained private information that could be used to the
managers’ benefit at the expense of the firm. Principals used their discretion in
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performance evaluations to protect themselves against agents’ manipulation of
accounting measures.
Fourth, principal discretion motivates adaptive agent behavior (Bol 2008). A
basic purpose of incentive contract design is to align agent incentives with the goals of
the principal. When new information becomes available after the contract is finalized,
agent incentives may become distorted. Discretion allows principals to incorporate this
new information to restore the alignment of principals’ goals and agents’ incentives.
Principals can incentivize changes to agent performance with the use of either subjective
weights or discretionary adjustments to performance measures.
Hoppe and Moers (2011) found that boards of directors used subjective weights to
assure goal congruity in CEO incentive contracts. The study defined subjective weights
as the ex ante absence of any formula in a contract. A congruity problem existed when
agents’ optimal course of action was difficult to know because of environmental
unpredictability. Subjective weights addressed the congruity problem because subjective
weights allowed principals the flexibility to incorporate any information that was relevant
at the time of agent performance evaluation rather than only the information that was
available when the contract was signed.
Using car dealership survey data, Gibbs et al. (2009) examined whether
dealerships weighted performance measures with uncontrollable risk less than
performance measures with more controllable risk. Controllable risk was defined as
environmental uncertainty that agents can react to and uncontrollable risk was defined as
environmental uncertainty that agents cannot react to (noise). Gibbs et al. (2009) found
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that dealerships used discretion to weight more heavily those performance measures with
controllable risk than performance measures with uncontrollable risk.
Bol et al. (2015) showed that principals were less willing to make discretionary
adjustments to agent performance measures for an uncontrollable event when future
event likelihood is high than when it is low. Using an experiment, the study manipulated
the event likelihood and measured the discretionary adjustment made by the principal.
The results show that principals used their discretion strategically in order to induce agent
innovation (Bol et al. 2015).
Fifth, principal discretion reduces perceived unfairness (Bol 2008). The justice
literature distinguishes two types of fairness: procedural justice is the fairness of the
process used to determine an outcome and distributive justice is the fairness of the
outcome (Folger and Konovsky 1989). The lack of either type of fairness can decrease
agent motivation, which can impact agent performance negatively. Principals can use
discretion to reduce perceived unfairness by adjusting for uncontrollable effects on
performance measures. Bol and Smith (2011) examined whether principals used
discretion in subjective agent evaluation to adjust for the effects of an uncontrollable
measure. The study found that principals used discretion to adjust for the impact of
uncontrollable events on the objective performance measure. More specifically,
principals used discretion to adjust agent performance evaluations upward when the
uncontrollable factor led to unfavorable outcomes for agents. However, principals did
not adjust downward when the uncontrollable factor led to favorable outcomes for agents
(Bol and Smith 2011).
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Principals can also use discretion to reduce perceived unfairness when a high
level of compensation interdependence exists. Compensation interdependence exists
when performance measures and compensation of one agent affects those of other agents
(Bol et al. 2015). Bol et al. (2015) examined whether principals would be less likely to
make discretionary adjustments for a negative uncontrollable event when doing so would
punish those agents who were unaffected by the negative uncontrollable event. The study
found that concerns for fairness reduced principals’ willingness to punish unaffected
agents.

2.3.2

Costs of Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation
Although principal discretion in agent performance evaluation has several

benefits, principal discretion can also be costly. This section discusses the following
costs of principal discretion: 1) reneging 2) inaccurate assessments 3) influence activities
and 4) uncertainty about performance measures (Bol 2008).
The first cost of principal discretion is reneging. Reneging occurs when
contracted performance is not rewarded (Prendergast 1993). Principals may not pay
agents because contracts with performance evaluation subject to principal discretion are
not legally enforceable. If agents expect principals not to pay, agents will not provide
effort. Therefore, agents’ reneging concerns are costly to the principal.
Principals can address agents’ reneging concerns by committing to fixed bonus
pools (Bol 2008). When using bonus pools, principals commit ex ante to allocate a
specified total bonus amount. Because the total bonus is determined by objective
measures that are contractible, principals no longer have incentives to renege. Principals
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then use non-contractible information to allocate the amounts in the bonus pools between
agents.
Baiman and Rajan (1995) used an analytical model to identify the ideal conditions
under which principals can incorporate this non-contractible information. Baiman and
Rajan (1995) showed that as long as the non-contractible information was informative
about at least one agent, the use of bonus pools resulted in a strict Pareto improvement.
The size of the pool was determined by an explicit formula ex ante and principals
committed ex ante to pay the entire amount of the pool. However, the allocation of the
pool was left to principal discretion. The use of the non-contractible information
motivated agents to exert effort.
Fisher et al. (2005) used an experiment to provide empirical support for Baiman
and Rajan’s (1995) model. Fisher et al. (2005) examined whether principal discretion
over the size of the total compensation pool and/or the allocation of this pool affected
opportunism by principals and agents. Giving principals full discretion over both
decisions reduces agent opportunism but not principal opportunism (Fisher et al. 2005).
Fisher et al. (2005) found that firm output and agent compensation were greater as long
as principals had discretion over the allocation of the pool but not the size of the pool.
Rajan and Resichelstein (2006) extended Baiman and Rajan (1995) and showed
that the use of bonus pools involved an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark
of optimal contracts based on objective information only. Agents incurred additional risk
because each agent’s pay depended on the performance of other agents covered by the
bonus pool (Bol 2008). Rajan and Reseichelstein (2006) found that this additional
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agency cost decreased as the precision of subjective information increased or as the
number of agents increased.
Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) studied the structure of optimal bonus pool
arrangements when bonus pools used both objective and subjective performance
measures. The study demonstrated that principals obtained the optimal bonus pool
arrangement when principals ignored subjective information for all but the lowest
possible objective outcome. Also, Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) provided evidence that
the bonus pool corresponding to the lowest objective outcome was always paid out in full
to agents unless the subjective metric assumed the worst possible outcome.
Ederhof (2010)’s analytical model extended Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) by
showing that firms were more likely to pay discretionary bonuses when the outcome of
the contractible measure was either low or high but not when the contractible measure
was in the middle. Ederhof (2010) hypothesized that discretionary bonuses disclosed the
board’s assessment of non-contractible performance measures and that non-contractible
measures were correlated with contractible measures. When contractible measures were
high or low, principals had more certainty about agent performance than when
contractible measures were in the middle so the additional agency cost of discretionary
bonuses was lower.
The second cost of principal discretion is inaccurate performance assessments.
Most principals are not the residual claimants of agents’ outputs so principals have little
incentive to renege. However, principals can use discretion to serve their self-interests
which can lead to inaccurate or biased performance assessments (Prendergast and Topel
1993; Bol 2011).
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Many studies show that performance evaluations with principal discretion are
subject not only to systematic bias but also to bias due to personal attributes of agents
(Kingsbury 1922, Thorndike 1949, Feldman 1981). Two well-known systematic biases
are centrality bias and leniency bias. Centrality bias refers to the tendency to compress
performance ratings, and leniency bias refers to the tendency to inflate performance
ratings (Bol 2011). Moers (2005) demonstrated that performance measure diversity and
discretion in performance measurement led to more compressed ratings and to more
lenient performance ratings.
Inaccurate performance evaluations are costly to the principal for three reasons.
First, inaccuracies in performance evaluations can lead to less productivity because
inaccuracies weaken the link between pay and performance (Prendergast 1999). As a
result, performance evaluation bias reduces incentives for agent effort. Bol (2011)
showed that centrality bias decreased agent motivation which decreased agent
performance.
Second, inaccurate assessments are costly to the principal because they can lead
to favoritism which negatively affects the perceived fairness of the compensation contract
(Bol 2008). Favoritism leads to lower perceived procedural justice for other agents.
Lower perceived procedural justice decreased agent motivation and organizational
commitment (McFarlin & Sweeney 1992; Prendergast and Topel 1993). With data from
a leading international financial services provider, Ittner et al. (2003) demonstrated that
the use of subjectivity in weighting scorecard measures led agents to complain about
favoritism in bonus awards. The perceived unfairness led agents to question the firm’s
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use of the scorecard for compensation purposes (Ittner et al. 2003). Eventually the firm
stopped using the balanced scorecard.
Third, inaccurate assessments are costly to the principal because they can lead to
personnel issues. Low performing agents may get promoted at the expense of high
performing agents that may lead other agents who feel discriminated against to resign
(Bol 2008). Sebald (2014) demonstrated that agents retaliated when subjective
assessments were below agent expectations. In an experiment, agents’ reactions to
principals’ subjective feedback depended on agents’ self-perception.
Four reasons explain why principals tend to assess performance inaccurately.
First, the use of accompanying performance measures may lead to inaccurate
assessments. Moers (2005) demonstrated that the use of multiple objective performance
measures and the use of subjective performance measures were related to more
compressed ratings and more lenient ratings. Bol and Smith (2011) examined how
principals’ subjective performance evaluations were affected by the level and
controllability of an objective performance measure on a separate aspect of agent
performance. The study found that principals' subjective evaluations were significantly
higher when the objective level of the other performance measure was relatively high.
Woods (2012) showed that principals' subjective adjustments to objective performance
measures were influenced by prior subjective agent evaluations.
A second reason for inaccurate assessments is the strength of the principal-agent
relationship (Bol 2008). Principals may refrain from giving harsh but accurate
performance assessments to avoid damaging their relationships with agents. Using
incentive plan data from a financial service provider, Bol (2011) found that the strength
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of agent-principal relationship positively affected centrality bias and leniency bias.
Specifically, principals gave less compressed and less lenient ratings when the principal agent relationship was weaker (Bol 2011).
A third reason for inaccurate assessments is high information gathering costs (Bol
2008). Assessing performance can be costly to principals because principals must invest
time to evaluate agents. To avoid confrontation with agents who may question their
performance assessments, principals inflate performance ratings (Bernardin et al. 2000).
Bol (2011) showed that information gathering costs led to centrality bias and leniency
bias.
A fourth reason for inaccurate assessments is the cognitive limitations of
principals (Bol 2008). Cognitive limitations may lead to bias as a result of failing to
make sufficient adjustments. Bailey et al. (2011) demonstrated that principals failed to
make sufficient adjustments when principals incorporated non-contractible information.
The study investigated the effect of discretion extent on discretionary bonus allocations
by using either full discretion (allocation of the entire bonus pool) or partial discretion
(allocation of some of the bonus pool). Bailey et al. (2011) found that principals used an
anchoring approach to allocate discretionary bonuses rather than integrate both
contractible and non-contractible information into a single comprehensive measure. With
full discretion, principals tended to anchor on a subset of information and failed to
adequately incorporate the non-contractible information (Bailey et al. 2011). The
principals’ use of an anchoring approach may help to explain principals’ propensity
toward the halo effect. The halo effect is a cognitive bias that may occur when 1)
principals weight one measure of performance higher than another performance measure
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and 2) positive performance on the favored measure creates a positive halo that affects
the overall evaluation (Bailey et al. 2011).
The third cost of principal discretion is influence activities (Bol 2008). Agents
may try to influence principals to increase the likelihood of more favorable assessments.
Influence activities may take many forms including ingratiation. Ingratiation is behavior
designed to increase principals’ liking of agents or to make agents appear friendly to get
what agents want (Higgins, Judge and Ferris 2003). Influence activities are costly to
principals because agents spend time and effort trying to influence principals instead of
being productive. Other costs of influence activities include inefficient decision-making
and deadweight losses in firm value (Milgrom 1988; MacLeod 2003).
Du et al. (2012) studied Chinese government evaluations of Chinese state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and found that influence activities affected performance evaluations
positively. To assess the level of influence activities, Du et al. (2012) used the political
connections of the SOEs’ top executives and the geographic proximity between the
Chinese government central offices and the SOE headquarters. The study found that the
level of political connections and geographic proximity positively affected the SOEs’
evaluation scores.
The fourth cost of principal discretion is agent uncertainty about performance
measures (Bol 2008). When principals use discretion, agents may not know what
behaviors or outcomes principals expect. This ambiguity creates uncertainty about
performance measures. Uncertainty about performance measures may decrease agent
motivation which can lead to decreased agent effort. Uncertainty about performance
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measures is costly to principals because uncertainty reduces the incentive effect of
compensation contracts (Bol 2008).
Ittner et al. (2003) showed that allowing subjectivity in balanced scorecard
weighting led to performance measure uncertainty. Measures that were predictive of
future financial performance were ignored and too much weight was put on measures that
were not predictive. The study found that criteria were changed from quarter to quarter
and factors other than the chosen performance measures were included in the evaluation.
This section discussed both the benefits and costs of principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation. On the one hand, principal discretion compensates for
inadequate objective performance measures, reduces agent compensation risk, limits
performance measure manipulation, motivates adaptive agent behavior and reduces
perceived unfairness. On the other hand, principal discretion may lead to reneging by the
principal, inaccurate performance assessments, influence activities and uncertainty about
performance measures.

Chapter Summary
Incentive contract framing influences agents’ judgments and behavior. Studies
show that even though agents prefer incentive contracts framed as bonuses rather than
penalties, incentive contracts without principal discretion that are framed as penalties led
to higher agent effort than contracts framed as bonuses. However, in practice, many
incentive contracts allow for principal discretion. Principal discretion introduces benefits
and costs that may change agent behavior. For example, incentive contracts with
principal discretion that are framed as bonuses led to higher agent effort than incentive
contracts framed as penalties (Christ et al. 2012).
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Because studies on the effects of incentive contract framing such as Hannan et al.
(2005) and Christ et al. (2012) use different mechanisms, it is unclear how incentive
contract framing shapes agent behavior. Christ et al. (2012) suggests that future research
examine when the effect of one mechanism might outweigh the other. To more fully
understand how contract framing affects agent behavior, the next chapter hypothesizes 1)
how the two models fit together and 2) how the use of principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation affects the new combined model.
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Chapter 3

Hypotheses Development

Chapter Overview
This chapter combines the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models
and adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to hypothesize how
contract framing affects agent behavior. Section 3.2 illustrates the overall model for the
study. Section 3.3 explains the model and Section 3.4 presents the study’s hypotheses.
Section 3.5 concludes with a summary of the hypotheses.

Model Overview
The figure below illustrates the model for the study:
Figure 3: Model Overview
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Explanation of the Model
This section explains the model found in Figure 3. Each subsection explains a
single path in the model.

3.3.1

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Perceived Fairness
(Path 1)
Principals usually evaluate agent performance to determine reward outcomes (Bol

2008). Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation means that principals use
subjective judgment to assess performance. Principal judgment may be based on personal
impressions, feelings and options, rather than on external facts (Bol 2008). Procedural
justice is the fairness of the process used to determine an outcome whereas distributive
justice is the fairness of the outcome (Folger and Konovsky 1989). An important element
of procedural justice in agent performance evaluation is consistency (Prendergast &
Topel 1993). Principal discretion, however, opens the door to inconsistency. The use of
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation can lead to low perceptions of
procedural justice by managers (Bellavance 2013).
Incentive contracts are formal controls that can be framed either as a bonus that
offers agents a monetary reward if performance goals are met or as a penalty that reduces
monetary payouts if performance goals are not met (Christ et al. 2012). Luft (1994)
attributes the differences in agent preferences for bonus and penalty contracts to loss
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Loss aversion describes the finding that
individuals experience greater disutility from the perceived loss associated with paying a
penalty than from the perceived forgone gain associated with not receiving an equivalent
bonus (Hannan et al. 2005). Loss aversion suggests that having to pay a penalty under a
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penalty contract is a less favorable outcome than foregoing a similar sized bonus under a
bonus contract.
In general, people expect and want procedures to be fair and outcomes to be
favorable. People will be more likely to begin to ask questions and look for information
to make sense of their situations when outcomes are unfavorable (Pyszcznski &
Greenberg 1981). When people are looking to make sense of their situations, external
cues that address their information needs are especially influential. When an outcome is
unfavorable, the level of procedural fairness provides information that can make sense of
the situation (Brockner and Wiesenfield 1996). Therefore, people will react to
unfavorable outcomes more than they will to favorable outcomes by closely examining
the procedures that gave rise to those outcomes. This will increase the effect of perceived
procedural fairness on their interpretation of and reaction especially to negative
outcomes.
Under a favorable outcome such as a bonus contract, people will be less likely to
seek additional information to make sense of the situation because the situation is
favorable. It follows that the level of procedural fairness will not influence people’s
fairness perceptions. Therefore the use of principal discretion will not moderate people’s
fairness perceptions of a bonus contract.
When an outcome is unfavorable such as a penalty contract, people are more
likely to seek information to make sense of their situations. The level of procedural
fairness will provide external cues to address people’s information needs. Lower (higher)
levels of procedural fairness lead to lower (higher) perceived fairness than higher (lower)
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levels of procedural fairness. The existence of principal discretion leads to lower levels
of procedural fairness than the absence of principal discretion (Bellavance 2013). It
follows that the existence (absence) of principal discretion leads to lower (higher)
perceived fairness that increases (decreases) the negative effect of the penalty frame.
Therefore the negative effect of a penalty contract is greater when accompanied by
principal discretion.
Taken together, agents under a penalty contract will report lower levels of
perceived fairness than agents under a bonus contract. Also principal discretion will
moderate the relationship between contract type and perceived fairness such that using a
penalty contract will reduce perceived fairness more with the use of principal discretion
than without the use of principal discretion (Path 1).

3.3.2

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Expected
Disappointment (Path 2)
Attribution theory explains how people make causal explanations. When

considering the principal’s choice of incentive contract, attribution theory suggests that
agents are more likely to attribute the principal’s choice of incentive contract to the
personal characteristics of the principal rather than to situational factors (Ross 1977).
This tendency of perceivers to over emphasize causality to internal factors in the actor
rather than to situational factors is commonly known as correspondence bias or
fundamental attribution error (Green et al. 1985). Agents have an unfavorable view of
penalty contracts due to loss aversion. Attribution theory suggests that agents will have a
negative view of the principal’s decision to implement a penalty contract. Therefore
agents will attribute negative character qualities to those principals who choose to
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implement penalty contracts. This attribution will affect agents’ interpretation of
principal discretion. Instead of viewing principal discretion as a way to help agents,
agents will view principal discretion as a way to further penalize them. Therefore,
agents will expect to be more disappointed when the penalty contract includes principal
discretion than when the penalty contract does not include principal discretion.
In summary, agents under a penalty contract with discretion will expect to be
more disappointed about having to pay a penalty than agents under a bonus contract with
discretion will expect to be about not receiving an economically equivalent bonus. Also
principal discretion will moderate the relationship between penalty contract and expected
disappointment such that agents under a penalty contract will have higher expected
disappointment with the use of principal discretion than without the use of principal
discretion (Path 2).

3.3.3

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Perceived Intrusion
(Path 3)
Intrusion is defined as “interference with normal processes and activities” (Christ

et al. 2008). Intrusion can be invasive and possibly disruptive, with the controlling party
engaging in some kind of participation or interference in the controlled party’s processes
and activities. Change management research documents the disruptive nature of
mandatory management innovations (Christ et al. 2008). Specifically, a “loss of routine”
or a “destruction of existing habit” that results from management innovations plays an
important role in the process of change and in the level of resistance to change (Christ et
al. 2008). Similarly, the intrusiveness of a control system plays an important role in
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whether the control system impacts the level of trust in an organization (Christ et al.
2008).
The trust literature shows the effects of negatively framed controls. Negatively
framed controls damage trust (Das and Teng 1998; Enzle and Anderson 1993; Malhotra
and Murnighan 2002) because they are perceived as interfering with agents’ normal
processes and activities (Christ et al. 2008). The effects of framing an incentive contract
negatively as a penalty contract are similar to the effects of negatively framed controls
(Christ et al. 2012). It follows that agents will report higher levels of perceived intrusion
under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.
Attribution theory suggests that agents faced with a penalty contract will attribute
negative qualities to principals (see above). Attribution theory explains that people
attribute the cause of another person’s negative behavior to his or her negative character
qualities rather than to situational factors. For example, someone’s anger is because he or
she is bad-tempered. If agents perceive the principal’s selection of a penalty contract as
intrusive (Christ et al. 2012) then attribution theory suggests agents will attribute the
selection of a penalty contract to the principal’s intrusive personality. This attribution
will affect agents’ interpretation of principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.
Instead of viewing principal discretion as a way to help agents, agents will view principal
discretion negatively due to their view of the principal’s personality. Therefore, agents
will have higher levels of perceived intrusion when the penalty contract includes
principal discretion than when the penalty contract excludes principal discretion.
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Taken together, agents under a penalty contract will report higher levels of
perceived intrusion than agents under a bonus contract. Also principal discretion will
moderate the relationship between penalty contract and perceived intrusion such that
using a penalty contract will increase perceived intrusion more with the use of principal
discretion than without the use of principal discretion (Path 3).

3.3.4

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Perceived Autonomy
(Path 4)
Formal controls reduce agent autonomy (Das and Teng 1998). That is, a formal

control limits the decision rights of agents by specifying clear boundaries which may
include specific behaviors, operations or activities (Christ 2008). In general, when
individuals feel that their freedoms are being restricted, individuals have negative
reactions. Psychological Reactance Theory (Brehm and Brehm 2013) provides a
framework for understanding the psychological effects of restrictions to freedoms. The
theory assumes that a person has a set of free behaviors and will experience a form of
psychological arousal called reactance whenever any of those behaviors are eliminated or
threatened with elimination. The person who experiences reactance will be motivated to
restore the specific freedom that was lost or threatened. Reactance may lead to hostility
or aggression toward the threatening agent of the restriction.
Implementation of a negatively framed control damages the trust environment
(Das and Teng 1998; Enzle and Anderson 1993; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002).
Negatively framed controls damage the trust environment because agents perceive that
negatively framed controls reduce autonomy (Christ et al. 2008). The effects of framing
an incentive contract negatively as a penalty contract are similar to the effects of
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negatively framed controls (Christ et al. 2012). It follows that agents will report lower
levels of perceived autonomy under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.
Attribution theory suggests that agents faced with penalty contracts will attribute
negative qualities to principals (see above). Because agents perceive a loss of autonomy
with penalty contracts, they will interpret the principal’s decision to implement the
penalty contract as a controlling behavior. If agents perceive the principal’s selection of
a penalty contract as a controlling behavior, then attribution theory suggests that agents
will attribute the principal’s controlling behavior to the principal’s controlling
personality. This attribution will influence agent interpretation of principal discretion.
Instead of viewing principal discretion as a way to help agents, agents will view principal
discretion as a way for the principal to control the agent. Therefore, agents will have
lower levels of perceived autonomy when the penalty contract includes principal
discretion than when the penalty contract excludes principal discretion.
In summary, agents will report lower levels of perceived autonomy under a
penalty contract than under a bonus contract. Also principal discretion will moderate the
relationship between penalty contract and perceived autonomy such that using a penalty
contract will decrease perceived autonomy more with the use of principal discretion than
without the use of principal discretion (Path 4).

3.3.5

Effect of Perceived Autonomy and Perceived Intrusion on Signals of
Questioning Integrity and Questioning Competence (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d)
When agents feel that controls are intrusive or decrease agents’ perceived

autonomy, agents will interpret these controls as signals of principals’ beliefs about
agents (Christ et al. 2012). As agents’ perceived loss of autonomy decreases and
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perceived intrusion increases, agents are more inclined to believe that principals are
questioning agent integrity and competence (Christ et al. 2012). More specifically, agents
will perceive that principals are questioning their competence (Path 5a) and their integrity
(Path 5b) more as perceived intrusion increases. Also, agents will perceive that principals
are questioning their competence (Path 5c) and their integrity (Path 5d) more as
perceived autonomy decreases.

3.3.6

Effect of Signals of Questioning Integrity and Questioning Competence on
Perceived Trust (Paths 6a, 6b)
To the degree that principals question agent integrity and competence, agents will

perceive less trust from principals regardless of the level of principal discretion (Das and
Teng 2001; Christ et al. 2012). Specifically, agents who perceive more questioning of
their competence will report lower levels of perceived trust from principals than agents
who perceive less questioning of their competence from principals (Path 6a). Also, agents
who perceive more questioning of their integrity will report lower levels of perceived
trust from principals than agents who perceive less questioning of their integrity from
principals (Path 6b).

3.3.7

Effect of Perceived Trust on Reciprocal Trust (Path 7)
Social projection theory states that individuals have a tendency to expect

similarities between themselves and others (Krueger 1998). This leads individuals to
base what they think others will do on their own beliefs. It follows that principals will
expect agents to behave the way principals themselves would behave. Therefore,
principals’ signals of trust (mistrust) in agents are signals of the principals’
trustworthiness (lack of trustworthiness). Trust can generate the very behavior that might
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logically seem to be its precondition and distrust can lead to behavior that bolsters the
validity of the distrust (Gambetta 1988). Because trust is reciprocal (Gambetta 1988),
agents will decrease trust in principals as the level of perceived trust from principals
diminishes regardless of the presence or absence of principal discretion. Therefore,
agents who perceive less trust from principals will trust principals less than agents who
perceive more trust from principals (Path 7).

3.3.8

Effect of Expected Disappointment on Effort for Task Under Contract (Path
8)
Conventional economic theory assumes that agents who have higher incremental

utility for money will work harder for money than those who have lower incremental
utility for money (Hannan et al. 2005). It follows that if agents who have higher
incremental utility for money do not receive the higher payment (i.e. because they had to
pay the penalty or forego the bonus), they will experience a greater reduction in utility
than those who have a lower incremental utility for money (Hannan et al. 2005).
“Expected disappointment” relates to this decrease in utility from having to pay a penalty
or by not receiving a bonus. Therefore greater expected disappointment will result in
higher agent effort (Path 8).

3.3.9

Effect of Perceived Fairness on Effort for Task Under Contract (Path 9)
The theory of reciprocity suggests that individuals who feel that they are treated

fairly by another party will reciprocate by treating the other party kindly in return
(Goranson and Berkowitz 1966). It follows that agents who perceive their contract to be
fairer will choose a higher level of effort than those who perceive their contract to be less
fair (Hannan et al. 2005). The reciprocity will persist for both bonus and penalty
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contracts regardless of the level of principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.
Therefore agents who perceive their contracts to be less fair will expend lower effort than
agents who perceive their contracts to be more fair (Path 9).

3.3.10 Effect of Reciprocal Trust on Effort for Task Under Contract (Path 10)
When reciprocal trust is low, agents perceive that pay is less certain than when
reciprocal trust is high. When agent pay is less certain, agents carry more risk than when
agent pay is more certain. When agents bear more risk, agents want more pay for equal
work which makes agents work less for equal pay. Therefore agents who reciprocate less
trust will expend lower effort than agents who reciprocate more trust (Path 10).

3.3.11 Effect of Effort for Task Under Contract on Performance (Path 11)
When skill is held constant and the task is effort sensitive, increased effort leads
to an improvement in the rewarded dimension of task performance (Bonner & Sprinkle
2002). Incentives increase agent desire to increase performance. This desire to increase
performance motivates agents to exert effort because increases in effort are expected to
lead to increases in expected performance. Therefore, agent performance will increase
with effort on task under contract (Path 11).

3.3.12 Effect of Reciprocal Trust on Effort for Task Not Under Contract (Path 12)
In the task not under contract that allows principal discretion over agent
compensation, agent trust in principals to reward agents becomes important in agent
effort choice due to principal opportunism (Fisher et al. 2005). When trust is low, agents
have less expectancy that agent effort will be rewarded by principals and will choose less
effort. In contrast, when trust is high, agents will have a higher positive expectancy that
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agent effort will be rewarded by principals (Christ et al. 2012). Therefore agent effort on
task not under contract will increase as reciprocal trust increases (Path 12).

3.3.13 Effect of Effort for Task Not Under Contract on Performance (Path 13)
Holding skill constant, increased effort leads to improvements in performance
(Bonner & Sprinkle 2002). It follows that agent performance on the task not under
contract will increase as effort increases (Path 13).

3.3.14 Effect of Perceived Fairness on Perceived Trust (Path 14)
To the degree that agents perceive that their contracts are unfair, agents will
perceive that they are being treated unfairly by the principal. Agents who perceive that
they are being treated unfairly by the principal will perceive less trust from the principal.

3.3.15 Effect of Expected Disappointment on Perceived Trust (Path 15)
Martinez and Zeelenberg (2015) found that increased disappointment induced
higher initial transfers in a trust game due to loss aversion. Thinking of disappointment
led first movers to avoid feelings of disappointment. To avoid feelings of
disappointment, first movers avoided disappointing others. To avoid disappointing
others, first movers transferred more money.
Similarly, to the degree that agents expect disappointment, agents will avoid
feelings of disappointment. To avoid feelings of disappointment, agents will avoid
disappointing the principal. To avoid disappointing the principal, agents will perceive
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trust from the principal. It follows that greater expected disappointment will result in
greater perceived trust. 2

Hypotheses
This section presents the study’s four research hypotheses based on the model
presented in Section 3.3. Each subsection explains one of the four hypotheses.

3.4.1

Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under Contract
In a setting without principal discretion, agent trust is not required for the task

under contract because the incentive contract specifies the payout for each potential
outcome. Expected disappointment will be higher under a penalty contract than under a
bonus contract (Path 2). Therefore, agent effort on the task under contract will be greater
under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract because greater expected
disappointment will result in higher agent effort (Path 8). The study’s first hypothesis is
formally stated below and illustrated in Figure 4:
H1: Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a penalty
contract than under a bonus contract.

2

Because Martinez and Zeelenberg (2015) used a trust game and because Task 2 in this study is a trust
game, this study expects similar results. Therefore, agents would trust more with higher expected
disappointment. If agents trust more and because trust is reciprocal, perceived trust would be higher.
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Figure 4: Predicted Effect of Contract Type on Agent Effort for Task Under
Contract

3.4.2

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task
Under Contract
This subsection adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to the

setting discussed in Section 3.4.1. The agent’s trust in the principal becomes important in
the agent’s effort decision for the task under contract because the principal has discretion
over the agent’s performance evaluation. Under a penalty (bonus) contract, the
interaction of principal discretion with contract frame leads to lower (higher) perceived
fairness (Path 1), higher (lower) expected disappointment (Path 2), higher (lower) levels
of perceived intrusion (Path 3) and lower (higher) levels of perceived autonomy (Path 4).
Reduced perceived fairness leads to lower (higher) perceived trust (Path 14),
lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort (Paths 9 and 10). The
perceived intrusion and perceived autonomy effects lead to higher (lower) levels of
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questioning competence and questioning integrity (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d), lower
(higher) perceived trust (Paths 6a, 6b), lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower
(higher) effort (Path 10). Taken together, the study predicts that agent effort on the task
under contract will be lower (higher) under a penalty contract with (without) principal
discretion. Also agent effort on the task under contract will be higher (lower) under a
bonus contract with (without) principal discretion.
Notwithstanding this prediction, one reason why principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation may result in a main effect instead of an interaction effect is loss
aversion. The greater expected disappointment from the interaction of principal discretion
and the penalty contract frame (Path 2) may increase aversion to disappointment.
Aversion to disappointment may increase the desire to not disappoint the principal. The
desire to not disappoint the principal may lead to higher perceived trust (Path 15), higher
reciprocal trust (Path 7) and higher effort (Paths 8 and 10). Principal discretion then
would increase effort on the task under contract for both penalty and bonus contracts.
Attribution theory, however, suggests that agents attribute negative personal
qualities to the principal as a result of the principal’s choice to implement a penalty
contract. The attribution of negative personal qualities to the principal will diminish the
desire to not disappoint the principal. It follows that the negative effect on effort of lower
perceived fairness, lower perceived autonomy and higher perceived intrusion will
dominate the positive effect of loss aversion on effort.
The study’s second hypothesis follows and is illustrated in Figure 5:
H2: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task under
contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be
lower (higher) with principal discretion than without principal discretion.
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Figure 5: Predicted Effect of Contract Type and Principal Discretion on Agent
Effort for Task Under Contract

3.4.3

Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under Contract
In a setting in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the

agent is responsible, the agent’s trust in the principal becomes important in the agent’s
effort decision for the task not under contract. This setting requires trust because the
principal has discretion over the agent’s compensation for the ungoverned task. A
penalty (bonus) contract leads to lower (higher) perceived fairness (Path 1), higher
(lower) expected disappointment (Path 2), higher (lower) levels of perceived intrusion
(Path 3) and lower (higher) levels of perceived autonomy (Path 4).
Higher expected disappointment leads to higher (lower) perceived trust (Path 15),
higher (lower) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and higher (lower) effort (Path 12). The
perceived fairness, perceived intrusion and perceived autonomy effects will dominate the
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expected disappointment effect (based on Christ et al. 2012). The perceived fairness
effect leads to lower (higher) perceived trust (Path 14), lower (higher) reciprocal trust
(Path 7) and to lower (higher) effort (Path 12). The perceived intrusion and perceived
autonomy effects lead to higher (lower) levels of questioning competence and
questioning integrity (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d), lower (higher) perceived trust (Paths 6a,
6b), lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort (Path 12). This
leads to the study’s third hypothesis which is illustrated in Figure 6:
H3: Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a bonus
contract than under a penalty contract.

Figure 6: Predicted Effect of Contract Type on Agent Effort for Task Not Under
Contract

3.4.4

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task
Not Under Contract
This subsection now adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to

the setting discussed in Section 3.4.3. The agent’s trust in the principal is important in
the agent’s effort decision for the task not under contract because the principal has
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discretion over both the agent’s performance evaluation and the agent’s compensation for
the ungoverned task. Under a penalty (bonus) contract, the interaction of incentive
contract frame and principal discretion in agent performance evaluation leads to lower
(higher) perceived fairness (Path 1), higher (lower) expected disappointment (Path 2),
higher (lower) levels of perceived intrusion (Path 3) and lower (higher) levels of
perceived autonomy (Path 4).
Lower perceived fairness leads to lower (higher) perceived trust (Path 14), lower
(higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort (Path 12). The perceived
intrusion and perceived autonomy effects lead to higher (lower) levels of questioning
competence and questioning integrity (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d), lower (higher) perceived
trust (Paths 6a, 6b), lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort
(Path 12). Taken together, the study predicts that agent effort on the task not under
contract will be lower (higher) under a penalty contract with (without) principal
discretion. Also agent effort on the task not under contract will be higher (lower) under a
bonus contract with (without) principal discretion.
Notwithstanding this prediction, one reason why principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation may result in a main effect instead of an interaction effect is loss
aversion. The greater expected disappointment from the interaction of principal discretion
and the penalty contract frame (Path 2) may increase aversion to disappointment.
Aversion to disappointment may increase the desire to not disappoint the principal. The
desire to not disappoint the principal may lead to higher perceived trust (Path 15), higher
reciprocal trust (Path 7) and higher effort (Path 12). Principal discretion then would
increase effort on the task not under contract for both penalty and bonus contracts.
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Attribution theory, however, suggests that agents attribute negative personal
qualities to the principal as a result of the principal’s choice to implement a penalty
contract. The attribution of negative personal qualities to the principal will diminish the
desire to not disappoint the principal. It follows that the negative effect on effort of lower
perceived fairness, lower perceived autonomy and higher perceived intrusion will
dominate the positive effect of loss aversion on effort. The study’s last hypothesis
follows and is illustrated in Figure 7:
H4: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task not
under contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will
be lower (higher) with principal discretion than without principal discretion.

Figure 7: Predicted Effect of Contract Type and Principal Discretion on Agent
Effort for Task Not Under Contract

Notwithstanding this prediction, one reason why the study may not find the
expected interaction for the task not under contract is because workplace norms might
influence agent interpretation of principal discretion. Workplace norms may play an
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important role especially for tasks that are not under contract. For example, workplace
norms related to cooperation, trust and reciprocity may mitigate the negative effect of
principal discretion under a penalty contract. Alternatively, workplace norms related to
lack of cooperation, mistrust and lack of reciprocity may lessen the positive effect of
principal discretion under a bonus contract.

Chapter Summary
This chapter combines the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models
and adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to hypothesize how
contract framing affects agent behavior. These hypotheses are summarized in the
following table:
Table 1: Hypotheses Summary

H1:

H2:

H3:

H4:

Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under Contract
Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a penalty contract than
under a bonus contract.
Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task
Under Contract
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the relationship
between incentive contract and agent effort on the task under contract such that
agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be lower (higher) with principal
discretion than without principal discretion.
Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under Contract
Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a bonus contract
than under a penalty contract.
Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task
Not Under Contract
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the relationship
between incentive contract and agent effort on the task not under contract such that
agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be lower (higher) with principal
discretion than without principal discretion.
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Agent effort on the task under contract is hypothesized to be greater under a
penalty contract than under a bonus contract. Agent effort on the task under contract
should be lower (higher) under a penalty (bonus) contract with principal discretion than
without principal discretion. Agent effort on the task not under contract is expected to be
greater under a bonus contract than under a penalty contract. Agent effort on the task not
under contract should be lower (higher) under a penalty (bonus) contract with principal
discretion than without principal discretion. The next chapter describes the research
methodology used to test these predictions.
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Chapter 4

Research Method

Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the research methods used to test the hypotheses developed
in Chapter 3 and is structured as follows: Section 4.2 explains the experimental design.
Section 4.3 describes the participants, tasks and procedures used in the experiment.
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 explain the operationalization of the independent and dependent
variables, respectively. Section 4.6 provides descriptions of items found in the complete
theoretical model as illustrated in Figure 3. Section 4.7 provides a summary of the
chapter.

Experimental Design
The study uses a 2 (Contract Frame) x 2 (Principal Discretion) betweenparticipants experimental design. Contract Frame is an incentive contract framed either
as a bonus contract (hereafter, bonus contract) or as a penalty contract (hereafter, penalty
contract). Bonus contract pays agents a bonus if their performance meets or exceeds the
performance target. Penalty contract requires agents to pay a penalty if their
performance fails to meet the performance target. The study manipulates the second
variable - Principal Discretion - by using either an ex ante performance target (hereafter,
no principal discretion) or an ex post performance target set by the principal (hereafter,
principal discretion). The four experimental conditions are: bonus contract/no principal
discretion, bonus contract/principal discretion, penalty contract/no principal discretion
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and penalty contract/principal discretion. Two dependent variables are then measured:
1) agent effort on the task under contract and 2) agent effort on the task not under
contract. The following table summarizes the 2 x 2 research design.

Table 2: Experimental Design

Principal Discretion

Contract Frame
Bonus
Penalty
Cell 1
Cell 3
Cell 2
Cell 4

No
Yes

Administration of the Experiment
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.
Unlike Christ et al. (2012), the experiment used a confederate to be the principal rather
than a one-to-one pairing between principals and agents. Based on the theory from
Chapter 3, the study does not depend on the ratio of agents to principals. Also, whether
the principal is a confederate should not affect the results because the principal does not
interact with the agents. The study relies on agents believing that the principal is a
person who chooses their contracts. This is important because this choice signals the
principal’s trust in the agent (Christ et al. 2012). The principal’s role and principal’s
compensation scheme in this study are identical to the principal’s role and principal’s
compensation scheme found in Christ et al. (2012).
To make sure that results were not affected by labels, the study referred to the
agent role and the principal role as Participant A and Participant B, respectively.
Participants remained in the agent role throughout both tasks of the experiment. The
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experiment used a single-period model to control for reputation and other social effects
that were not the focus of the study.

4.3.1

Participants
Participants were 117 undergraduate students from a large public university who

were recruited through the business school’s research participation program. Participants
received research participation credit and also had the opportunity to earn monetary
compensation through their participation in the study.

4.3.2

Task 1 and Task 2 Descriptions
Participants began the experiment with an endowment. Agents in the bonus

contract conditions were endowed with 850 points and agents in the penalty contract
conditions started with 1,000 points. The principal began with 250 points in all
experimental conditions. At the end of the experiment, participants were paid using the
following formula: .025 x Earned Points = Payment in U.S. dollars.
Participants in the experiment completed two computerized tasks which were both
adapted from Christ et al. (2012). The first task required agents to select a portfolio of
investments for the benefit of the principal. Agents paid for the investments using points
from their endowment. Agents could earn a bonus or pay a penalty depending on
whether their portfolio achieved a performance target. In the two principal discretion
conditions, bonus contract/principal discretion, and penalty contract/principal discretion,
the principal could adjust ex post the performance target that determined whether agents
received a bonus or paid a penalty.
The first task followed prior literature (e.g. Christ et al. 2012; Fehr et al. 1993)
and represented agent effort using a costly choice. The operationalization of effort was
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consistent with the agency theory definition of effort (Baiman 1982). Investing in shares
was an effort choice that was controlled by agents, resulted in disutility (agents paid for
the shares) and increased the probability of reaching the target outcome (Christ et al.
2012, Hannan et al. 2005).
The second task was a modified trust game with agent pay determined entirely by
the principal rather than by incentive contracts. Agents purchased investments on behalf
of the principal and then the principal decided how much of the investment returns to
share with the agent. Similar to Task 1, agents’ costly choices represented a measure of
agent effort (Christ et al. 2012; Fehr et al. 1993).

4.3.3

Task 1 Procedures
The experimental procedure for Task 1 consisted of nine steps.

1) Enter the Experiment
Participants entered the room and the administrator assigned each participant to a
computer station. Once seated, participants were told to follow the instructions on the
computer screen.
2) Read the Overview of the Study
Participants read and learned the instructions for both roles (either Participant A
or Participant B). After participants had finished reading the instructions, the computer
randomly assigned participants to their experimental condition.
3) Learn about the Agent Investment Decision
Agents had the task of selecting a portfolio of investments from 30 possible
investments and paying for their portfolio using their endowment. The goal was to
maximize the returns for the principal by selecting the 10 shares that were expected to
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make the highest returns in the next period. Agents selected and paid for one share each
of 10 different investments which earned points for the principal.
The two types of investments that agents could choose from were either “Bell” or
“Whistle” investments. Agents paid 10 points for each Bell share and 25 points for each
Whistle share. Although Whistle shares cost more, Whistle shares earned higher returns
than Bell shares. Because agents paid for the investments from their endowment, agents
preferred to purchase the cheaper Bell shares. The principal, however, favored the more
expensive Whistle shares because the Whistle shares earned higher returns. On average,
the 15 Bell shares earned approximately 20 points per share in the next period and the 15
Whistle shares earned approximately 50 points per share in the next period. The study
provided participants with graphical representations of the previous 19 periods of returns
(points per share) for each of the 30 possible investments. The graphs did not show the
expected returns for the next period. For example, the graph below shows one
investment’s return history of points per share (Christ et al. 2012):
Figure 8: Sample Investment Return History
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4) Learn about the Principal Contract Implementation Decision
The principal decided which type of control system to implement prior to agents’
investment decisions. The control system established a bonus or penalty system that
either included or did not include principal discretion. In all four experimental conditions,
bonuses (penalties) were paid from (to) an administrators fund rather than from (to) the
principal’s endowment. This kept the principal’s cost of contract implementation (at 50
points) constant across all conditions.
5) Learn about the Principal Discretion Decision (Discretion Conditions Only)
Participants learned that the principal could decide whether and how much to
adjust the performance target which determined whether or not agents received a bonus
in the bonus contract condition or paid a penalty in the penalty contract condition. The
principal could set the target anywhere between 400 and 600 points after they had learned
how many points the agent had earned. The principal and agents received this
information near the end of the study (after the end of Task 2).
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6) Learn about the Agent Compensation Scheme
The agent compensation scheme is illustrated in Table 3:
Table 3: Agent Compensation Scheme

No Principal
Discretion

Total Share Returns
< 500

Total Share
Returns >= 500

Principal
Discretion

Total Share Returns
< Performance
Target Selected by
Principal
Total Share
Returns >=
Performance Target
Selected by Principal

Bonus
Contract
850 points
- Cost of
Shares

Penalty
Contract
1000 points –
Cost of Shares
-150 penalty
points

850 points
- Cost of
Shares
+ 150 bonus
points
850 points
- Cost of
Shares

1000 points –
Cost of Shares

850 points
- Cost of
Shares
+ 150 bonus
points

1000 points –
Cost of Shares
-150 penalty
points
1000 points –
Cost of Shares

Agents began with an endowment of 850 points in the two bonus contract
conditions and 1,000 points in the two penalty contract conditions. Agents paid for the
10 shares selected (10 points for each Bell share and 25 points for each Whistle share)
from this fund. Agents could earn or lose points depending on their assigned condition.
In the bonus contract/no principal discretion condition, agents received a 150point bonus if the total amount of points earned from the 10 shares equaled or exceeded
500 points. If the total return from the 10 shares was less than 500 points, agents did not
receive a bonus. In the bonus contract/principal discretion condition, agents received a
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150-point bonus if the total amount of points earned from the 10 shares equaled or
exceeded the performance target selected by the principal. If the total return from the 10
shares was less than the selected target, agents did not receive a bonus.
For example, suppose the agent chose 7 Bell shares and 3 Whistle shares. Also
assume that the returns for these investments exceeded 500 points in the bonus
contract/no principal discretion condition or exceeded the performance target selected by
the principal in the bonus contract/principal discretion condition. The agent’s payoff
will equal 850 – (7 x 10) – (3 x 25) + 150 = 855 points. If the returns for the investments
were less than 500 in the bonus contract/no principal discretion condition or were less
than the performance target selected by the principal in the bonus contract/principal
discretion condition, the agent’s payoff will equal 850 – (7 x 10) – (3 x 25) = 705.
In the penalty contract/no principal discretion condition, agents paid a penalty of
150 points if the total return from their selected investments was less than 500 points. If
the return from the investments was 500 points or above, then agents did not pay a
penalty. In the penalty contract/principal discretion condition, agents paid a penalty of
150 points if the total return from their selected investments was less than the
performance target selected by the principal. If the total return from the 10 shares
equaled or exceeded the performance target selected by the principal, then agents did not
pay a penalty.
For example, suppose the agent chose 7 Bell shares and 3 Whistle shares. Also
assume that returns for these investments were less than 500 points in the penalty
contract/no principal discretion condition or were less than the performance target
selected by the principal in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition. The
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agent’s payoff will equal 1000 – (7 x 10) – (3 x 25) – 150 = 705 points. If the total return
for the investments exceeded 500 in the penalty contract/no principal discretion
condition or the performance target selected by the principal in the penalty
contract/principal discretion condition, the agent’s payoff will equal 1000 – (7 x 10) – (3
x 25) = 855.
6) Learn about the Principal Compensation Scheme
The principal compensation scheme is illustrated in Table 4:
Table 4: Principal Compensation Scheme
Bonus Contract
No Principal
Discretion

Principal
Discretion

Total Share
Returns < 500

250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost of
control system

Total Share
Returns >= 500

250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost of
control system

Total Share
Returns <
Performance Target
Selected by
Principal

250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost of
control system

Total Share
Returns >=
Performance Target
Selected by
Principal

250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost of
control system
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Penalty
Contract
250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost
of control
system
250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost
of control
system
250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost
of control
system
250 points +
total share
returns – 50
points for cost
of control
system

The principal was endowed with 250 points in all conditions. The principal received the
total return from the 10 shares selected by the agent. Because the principal chose to
implement the control system, the principal paid 50 points. The number of points the
principal earned depended on the total return of the shares selected by the agent:
Principal points = 250 points + total return on shares selected by the agent – cost of
control system. For example, suppose the total return of the 10 shares selected by the
agent was 400. The principal’s payoff will equal 250 + 400 – 50 = 600 points.
7) Answer Questions
Participants completed a series of questions to test their understanding of the two
roles and the compensation schemes and were required to answer these questions
correctly before continuing.
8) Make Contract Implementation (Principal) or Investment Decisions (Agents)
The principal randomly assigned participants to either a bonus or penalty control
system that either included or did not include principal discretion. The computer then
informed agents of the principal’s decision. Agents then viewed the graphs and made
investment decisions. In order not to affect the Task 2 results, actual returns from Task 1
were not made known to participants until after the end of Task 2.
9) Complete Task 1 Questionnaire
Agents used a 100-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal” to
indicate their perception of: 1) how fair their contracts were and 2) how disappointed they
will be if they did not receive the bonus or had to pay the penalty (Hannan et al. 2005).
Using the same scale, agents also specified how much: 1) the principal intruded into their
decisions 2) they had decision-making autonomy 3) the principal questioned their
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competence 4) the principal questioned their integrity 5) the principal trusted them and 6)
they trusted the principal (Christ et al. 2012).

4.3.4

Task 2 Procedures
The experimental procedure for Task 2 consisted of five steps.

1) Read Overview of Task
Participants began with the points remaining from the first task but participants
did not know their exact point totals. They learned that they had at least 600 points
remaining to complete Task 2.
2) Learn about Agent Investment Decision
Agents decided how many Horn shares to purchase (instead of Bell shares and
Whistle shares). Unlike Task 1, agents knew the return per Horn share for the next
period (30 points per share) and agents were able to purchase from 0 to 50 Horn shares
(instead of only one share) using their endowments. The principal earned the returns
from the Horn shares. All participants learned that the principal was allowed to share any
amount of the Horn investment returns with the agent.
3) Learn about Principal Pay Decision
The principal learned the number of shares the agent purchased and then decided
how much to return to the agent.
4) Answer Questions
Participants completed a short series of questions to test their understanding of the
task and were required to answer these questions correctly before continuing.
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5) Make Horn Investment Decision
Agents decided how many Horn shares to purchase. The computer notified the
principal of the amount purchased by the agent. The principal then used his discretion to
decide how much to return to the agent. Reciprocity theory suggests that the amount
returned by the principal to the agent would be in proportion to the amount initially
transferred by the agent to the principal (Falk & Fishbacher 2006).
After the completion of Task 2, the principal learned the total returns from Task 1
for the agents assigned to the principal discretion experimental conditions. The principal
used his discretion to choose a target level between 400 and 600 points. Agents paid (did
not pay) the penalty if their point total was below (above) the target level chosen by the
principal in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition. Agents did not receive
(received) the bonus if their point total was below (above) the target level chosen by the
principal in the bonus contract/principal discretion condition.
Participants then completed an exit questionnaire that included demographic and
manipulation check questions. Participants were paid and then dismissed.

Operationalization of the Independent Variables
The two independent variables, contract frame and principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation, were manipulated between subjects. All independent variables
were explained in the initial instructions provided to the participants. Participants were
required to correctly answer questions to show their understanding before they continued
the experiment.
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4.4.1

Incentive Contract Frame
Incentive contract frame was manipulated by using either a contract frame that

rewards agents who meet or exceed a certain performance target with a bonus (bonus
contract) or a contract frame that penalizes agents who fail to meet a certain performance
target with a penalty (penalty contract). The study maintained economic equivalence
across contract frame conditions.

4.4.2

Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation was manipulated by using

either an ex ante performance target (no principal discretion) or an ex post performance
target set by the principal (principal discretion). In the two no principal discretion
conditions, the study used a performance target of 500 points to determine whether agents
received a bonus or paid a penalty. In the two principal discretion conditions, the study
allowed (but did not require) the principal to choose a performance target between 400 to
600 points. The principal was allowed to make the adjustment after knowing the agent’s
performance.
Consistent with how discretionary adjustments are used in practice, the study
intentionally created ex ante uncertainty in two different ways. First, the study informed
participants that the principal was not required to adjust the performance target. This
created uncertainty as to whether the principal would use discretion. Second, the
condition stated that the principal could select any performance target between 400 and
600 points. This created uncertainty as to the level of the performance target.
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4.4.3

Summary of Independent Variables
The following table summarizes the manipulations of the independent variables:

Table 5: Operationalization of Independent Variables
Independent Variable Manipulations
Bonus Contract
 Contract
Frame

-Agents receive a bonus of 150 points if
performance meets or exceeds a
performance target.
-Agents pay a penalty of 150 points if
performance fails to meet a performance
target
-Performance target to determine bonus or
penalty is set ex ante at 500 points
-Principal chooses the performance target
that determines whether agents receive a
bonus or pay a penalty (between 400 –
600)

Penalty Contract


Principal
Discretion

No Principal
Discretion
Principal
Discretion

Operationalization of the Dependent Variables
The study measured two dependent variables: agent effort on the task under
contract and agent effort on the task not under contract. The following table summarizes
the measurement of the dependent variables.
Table 6: Operationalization of Dependent Variables
Dependent Variables
 Effort on Task Under Contract
 Effort on Task Not Under
Contract

Operational Definition
Total cost of all shares purchased in Task 1
Total number of Horn investments purchased in Task
2

Other Items in the Complete Theoretical Model
The complete theoretical model (see Figure 3) uses agents’ responses from the
Task 1 Questionnaire as well as the total number of points earned by agents for each of
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the two tasks. All questions from the Task 1 Questionnaire used a 100-point Likert scale
ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal.” The following table summarizes the other
items in the complete theoretical model:
Table 7: Other Items in the Complete Theoretical Model
Item
 Perceived Fairness


Expected Disappointment



Perceived Autonomy



Perceived Intrusion



Signal of Questioning
Competence
Signal of Questioning
Integrity
Perceived Trust
Reciprocal Trust
Performance on Task Under
Contract
Performance on Task Not
Under Contract







Item Description
To what extent agents thought that their contracts
were fair
To what extent agents thought they will be
disappointed if they had to pay the penalty or did
not receive the bonus
To what extent agents felt that they had the
autonomy to make decisions
To what extent agents felt that the principal had
intruded on agents’ decisions
To what extent agents felt that the principal
questioned agents’ competence
To what extent agents felt that the principal
questioned agents’ integrity
To what extent agents felt trusted by the principal
To what extent agents trusted the principal
Total number of points in Task 1
Total number of points in Task 2

Chapter Summary
This chapter described the experimental design, the participants in the experiment,
the experimental tasks and procedures, the operationalization of the independent and
dependent variables and the other items in the complete theoretical model. The
experimental design combined the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models
and added principal discretion in agent performance evaluation. The first task of the
experiment manipulated both the contract frame and the use of principal discretion. The

70

principal paid agents using either a bonus or penalty contract and either did or did not
have discretion to change the performance target which determined whether agents
received a bonus or paid a penalty. The second task was a modified trust game where
pay was at the discretion of the principal. The expected statistical tests that will be used
to analyze the study’s four hypotheses and to test the complete theoretical model (see
Figure 3) are presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5

Data Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview
Section 5.2 explains the determination of the sample size and checks the data for
random assignment, normality and equal variances. Section 5.3 tests the four hypotheses
generated in Chapter 3. Section 5.4 tests the complete theoretical model as depicted in
Figure 3. Section 5.5 concludes with a summary of the results.

General Analysis
An a priori power analysis was conducted to determine the total sample size
required for the study. The effect sizes from both Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al.
(2012) were used to estimate the effect size for the power analysis. The effect size for
Hannan et al. (2005) was medium (d =.55) and the effect size for Christ et al. (2012) was
large (d =.77). When alpha is set at .05 along with a medium effect size for eta squared
set at .0625 and power set at .80, it was determined that that a total sample size of 116
was required for a MANOVA with four groups (i.e. n =29 pairs for each group).
This study has two categorical independent variables, contract frame and principal
discretion in agent performance evaluation and two continuous dependent variables,
agent effort for the task under contract and agent effort for the task not under contract.
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) should be used to examine the relationship
between categorical independent variables and two or more dependent variables (Huck
1974) if the data meet three requirements: 1) random assignment of participants to the
study conditions 2) all groups come from normal populations and 3) all groups come
from populations with equal variances. If the data fail to meet these requirements, then
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nonparametric tests should be used. The next two sections. 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 examine
whether the data meet these three requirements.

5.2.1

Random Assignment
Participants randomly signed up for seven experiment sessions over two days.

All four experimental conditions were run in each session. Participant demographics
were collected in the post-experimental questionnaire to assure that participants were
randomly distributed across the four experimental conditions. Not finding any
differences in participant demographics across experimental conditions provides support
to the assumption of random assignment. The following table summarizes the mean
responses by cell:
Table 8: Participant Demographics by Experimental Condition
Bonus
Contract/
No
Principal
Discretion
Age
20.3
Gender
1.50
Experience
.68

Bonus
Contract/
Principal
Discretion
20.8
1.64
1.25

Penalty
Contract/
No
Principal
Discretion
20.0
1.57
.61

Penalty
Contract/
Principal
Discretion
21.2
1.35
1.89

P Value

.22
.14
.21

Experience is the number of years of full-time work experience. Gender is coded
“0” for male and “1” for female. All demographic variables were not significantly
different across cells. This analysis suggests that the participants were randomly
assigned to experimental treatments.
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5.2.2

Compliance with ANOVA’s Normality and Equal Variance Assumptions
The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to test whether the data for the two dependent

variables come from populations with normal distributions. The null-hypothesis of this
test is that the population is normally distributed. Therefore, if the p-value is greater than
.05, the null hypothesis that the data come from a normally distributed population cannot
be rejected. The p-value for Effort on Task Under Contract,1.0, and Effort on Task Not
Under Contract, .18, are both greater than .05. This would suggest that the data come
from a normally distributed population.
The standard deviations across cells suggest that the variables meet the equal
variances assumption. These statistics are in Table 9:
Table 9: Dependent Variable Standard Deviations by Cell

Standard
Deviation
Effort on Task
Under
Contract
Effort on Task
Not Under
Contract

Bonus
Contract/
No Principal
Discretion

Bonus
Contract/
Principal
Discretion

Penalty
Contract/
No Principal
Discretion

Penalty
Contract/
Principal
Discretion

13.49

13.31

17.24

16.53

14.74

14.58

18.20

15.81

Tests of Hypotheses
This section examines whether each hypothesis was supported or not supported.
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5.3.1

Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under Contract
In a contract setting without principal discretion, agent trust is not required for the

task under contract because the incentive contract specifies the payout for each potential
outcome. Expected disappointment will be higher under a penalty contract than under a
bonus contract. Therefore, agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a
penalty contract than under a bonus contract because greater expected disappointment
will result in higher agent effort. Hypothesis 1 states:
H1: Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a penalty
contract than under a bonus contract.

Table 10: Mean Effort on Task Under Contract by Experimental Condition

Principal Discretion

Contract Frame
Bonus
Penalty
173.0
179.5
171.25
175.0
172.16
177.29

No
Yes

Using a t-test, the mean effort on the task under contract in the penalty contract
condition, 177.29, was significantly higher (t = 1.82, p = .03) than in the bonus contract
condition, 172.16. This result supports Hypothesis 1.

5.3.2

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task
Under Contract
This subsection adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to the

previous hypothesis from Section 5.3.1. The agent’s trust in the principal becomes
important in the agent’s effort decision for the task under contract because the principal
has discretion over the agent’s performance evaluation. Attribution theory suggests that
agents attribute negative (positive) personal qualities to the principal as a result of the
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principal’s choice to implement a penalty (bonus) contract. The attribution of negative
(positive) personal qualities to the principal diminishes (increase) agent effort.
The study’s second hypothesis follows:
H2: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task under
contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be
lower (higher) with principal discretion than without principal discretion.
The mean effort on the task under contract in the bonus contract/no principal
discretion condition, 173.0, was higher than in the bonus contract/principal discretion
condition, 171.25. Also, the mean effort on the task under contract in the penalty
contract/no principal discretion condition, 179.5, was higher than in the penalty
contract/principal discretion condition, 175. Although the difference was in the correct
direction for the penalty contract conditions, the difference was not in the correct
direction for the bonus contract conditions. The overall differences are not statistically
significant (F = 1.59, p = .19) and Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
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Table 11: Effect of Frame and Discretion on Effort for Task Under Contract
Panel A: ANOVA on Effort for Task Under Contract

Sum of
DF
Squares
3 1113.558
113 26328.750
116 27442.308

Source
Model
Error
C. Total

Mean
Square
371.186
232.998

F Ratio
1.5931

Prob > F
0.1950

Panel B: Effect Tests on Effort for Task Under Contract

Source
Frame
Discretion
Frame*Discretion

DF
1
1
1

Sum of
Squares
767.6432
285.4117
55.2570

F Ratio
3.2946
1.2250
0.2372

Prob > F
0.0722
0.2707
0.6272

One reason for this result may be that the effort measure, Effort on Task Under
Contract, did not provide enough variance to show different levels of effort. The number
of points used to purchase Bell and Whistle shares were grouped mainly around only five
amounts, 205, 190, 175, 160 and 145. Five levels may not have been enough to show
significant effort differences across four different experimental conditions. The frequency
for each level of Effort on Task Under Contract is shown in the following table:
Table 12: Distribution Count of Effort for Task Under Contract
Points
130
145
160
175
190
205
220
Total

Frequency
1
6
30
44
30
5
1
117
77

Percent
.85
5.13
25.64
37.61
25.64
4.27
.85
100.00

5.3.3

Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under Contract
In a setting in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the

agent is responsible, the agent’s trust in the principal becomes important in the agent’s
effort decision for the task not under contract. This setting requires trust because the
principal has discretion over the agent’s compensation for the ungoverned task. A
penalty (bonus) contract leads to lower (higher) perceived fairness, higher (lower)
expected disappointment, higher (lower) levels of perceived intrusion and lower (higher)
levels of perceived autonomy. These effects lead to lower (higher) reciprocal trust and
lower (higher) effort.
This leads to the study’s third hypothesis:
H3: Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a bonus
contract than under a penalty contract.

Table 13: Mean Effort on Task Not Under Contract by Experimental Condition

Principal Discretion

Contract Frame
Bonus
Penalty
28.23
27.30
32.32
27.38
30.21
27.34

No
Yes

Using a t-test, the mean effort on the task not under contract in the bonus contract
condition, 30.21, was not significantly higher (t = -.98, p = .16) than in the penalty
contract condition, 27.34. This result does not support Hypothesis 3.
Loss aversion may explain the lack of support for Hypothesis 3. A significant
discrepancy exists between participants in the penalty contract and bonus contract
conditions who chose the highest effort level for the Task not under Contract (50 horn
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shares). Participants who chose this highest level of effort were 25% of the total number
of participants. Participants in the bonus contract condition had significantly higher
Reciprocal Trust and significantly lower Expected Disappointment than participants who
chose the highest effort level in the penalty contract condition. These results suggest that
participants in the penalty contract condition who chose the highest effort level may have
thought that choosing a higher effort level would result in a higher return.

5.3.4

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task
Not Under Contract
This subsection now adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to

the setting discussed in Section 5.3.3. The agent’s trust in the principal is important in
the agent’s effort decision for the task not under contract because the principal has
discretion over both the agent’s performance evaluation and the agent’s compensation for
the ungoverned task. Attribution theory suggests that agents would attribute negative
(positive) personal qualities to the principal as a result of the principal’s choice to
implement a penalty (bonus) contract. The attribution of negative (positive) personal
qualities to the principal would diminish (increase) agent effort.
The study’s last hypothesis follows:
H4: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task not
under contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will
be lower (higher) with principal discretion than without principal discretion.
The mean effort on Task Not Under Contract was higher in the bonus
contract/principal discretion condition, 32.3, than in the bonus contract/no principal
discretion condition, 28.23. Also, the mean effort on Task Not Under Contract was nearly
the same in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition, 27.38, as compared to the
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penalty contract/no principal discretion condition, 27.30. Although the difference was in
the correct direction for the bonus contract conditions, the difference was not in the
correct direction for the penalty contract conditions. The overall differences were not
statistically significant (F = .64, p = .59) and Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Table 14: Effect of Frame and Discretion on Effort for Task Not Under Contract
Panel A: ANOVA on Effort for Task Not Under Contract

Source
Model
Error
C. Total

Sum of
DF
Squares
3
482.698
113 28642.601
116 29125.299

Mean
Square
160.899
253.474

F Ratio
.6348

Prob > F
0.5941

Panel B: Effect Tests on Effort for Task Not Under Contract

Source
Frame
Discretion
Frame*Discretion

DF
1
1
1

Sum of
Squares
252.2285
126.8946
117.4187

F Ratio
0.9951
0.5006
0.4632

Prob > F
0.3206
0.4807
0.4975

One reason for the lack of support for Hypothesis 4 is similar to the reason for
Hypothesis 3. In the group of participants who chose the highest effort level for Task
Not Under Contract (50 horn shares), Expected Disappointment was significantly higher
in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition than in the penalty contract/no
principal discretion condition. Participants may have thought that choosing a higher
effort level would result in a higher return. Choosing the highest effort level may have
been an attempt to recoup expected financial losses from the first task.
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Test of Complete Theoretical Model
To further assess the underlying reason for why effort is different between the
penalty and bonus contract frame conditions, the study uses path analysis with structural
equation modeling methodology (SEM) to estimate the model found in Figure 3. The
study also uses path analysis with structural equation modeling methodology (SEM) to
assess whether contract frame and principal discretion interact and how the interaction
affects any of the variables found in the model.
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Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the complete
model as depicted in Figure 3:
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for the Complete Model
Means
(standard
deviations in
italics)

Effort on Task
Under Contracta
Effort on Task
Not Under
Contractb
Perceived
Fairnessc
Expected
Disappointmentc
Perceived
Intrusionc
Perceived
Autonomyc
Signal of
Questioning
Competencec
Signal of
Questioning
Integrityc
Perceived Trustc
Reciprocal
Trustc

Bonus
Contract/
No
Principal
Discretion

Bonus
Contract/
Principal
Discretion

Penalty
Contract/
No
Principal
Discretion

Penalty
Contract/
Principal
Discretion

n = 30
173.00
13.49
28.23
14.74

n = 28
171.25
13.31
32.32
14.58

n = 30
179.50
17.24
27.30
18.20

n = 29
175.00
16.53
27.38
15.81

72.20
23.40
74.37
30.28
33.77
23.10
76.10
20.03
51.57
34.14

74.39
16.47
77.71
23.00
46.04
28.53
69.00
24.06
51.29
28.92

56.97
26.93
81.97
23.37
38.73
31.77
73.13
21.46
55.90
30.14

70.76
21.55
74.93
32.83
39.79
29.63
73.86
23.29
46.90
27.35

44.00
32.57

41.68
30.22

45.23
30.76

36.48
26.48

55.10
30.46
52.27
28.83

44.43
26.77
53.86
26.17

41.93
27.15
46.53
25.91

38.62
26.70
43.07
20.26

a

Effort on Task Under Contract is measured using the number of points participants used
to purchase Bell and Whistle shares during Task 1 of the experiment.
b

Effort on Task Not Under Contract is measured using the number of Horn shares
participants purchased during Task 2 of the experiment.
c

Participants answered the following questions using a 100-point Likert scale (0 = not at
all to 100 = a significant amount):
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To what extent do you feel that Participant B’s control system is fair?
(Perceived Fairness)
To what extent would you be disappointed if you did not receive the bonus or
had to pay the penalty? (Expected Disappointment)
To what extent do you feel that Participant B has intruded on your decisions?
(Perceived Intrusion)
To what extent do you feel that you have the autonomy to make decisions?
(Perceived Autonomy)
To what extent do you feel that Participant B questions your competence?
(Signal of Questioning Competence)
To what extent do you feel that Participant B questions your integrity? (Signal
of Questioning Integrity)
To what extent do you feel that Participant B trusts you? (Perceived Trust)
To what extent do you trust Participant B (Reciprocal Trust)

To assess the data for the complete model, the study uses the Shapiro-Wilk test to
test for the normality of the data. The test shows that the data for all of the variables are
not distributed normally except for Effort on Task Under Contract, Effort on Task Not
Under Contract and Reciprocal Trust. The study transforms the data for all of the
variables using a log transformation.
To assess whether the data fits the complete model, the study uses a goodness of
fit test. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) indicates the relative improvement in fit of the
model compared to the null model (Kline 2005). The Comparative Fit Index for the
complete model is .92 which is above the recommended minimum value of .90 or greater
(Kline 2005). The fit of the complete model is confirmed with the Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation test. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)
is related to residuals in the model (Kline 2005). RMSEA values range from 0 to 1 with a
smaller RMSEA value indicating a better fit. RMSEA for the complete model is .05
which is below the acceptable maximum of .06 (Kline 2005). Thus, the model provides a
good fit for the data.
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The standardized path coefficients and statistical significance for the complete
model are presented in Figure 9:3

Figure 9: Test of Full Model: Interaction of Contract Frame and Principal
Discretion

Results indicate that there is an interaction between principal discretion and
contract frame and this interaction has a significant effect on Perceived Fairness.
Specifically, Perceived Fairness is significantly lower for the penalty contract/no
principal discretion condition as compared to the bonus contract/no principal discretion
(-.37, p < .01). When principal discretion is included, Perceived Fairness is not
significantly different between the penalty contract/principal discretion and bonus
contract/principal discretion conditions (-.04, p = .70). Path analysis confirms that the
3

To test for the interaction between contract frame and principal discretion, the study estimates the model
for two groups: no principal discretion and principal discretion. Each of the four hypothesized interactions
contain two standardized path coefficients, one for each group. The first coefficient is the coefficient for the
no principal discretion group and the second coefficient is for the principal discretion group.
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effect of Contract Frame on Effort on Task Under Contract, as discussed in Section 5.3.1,
occurs through Perceived Fairness. Contract Frame is negatively associated with
Perceived Fairness (-.37, p < .01). Perceived Fairness is negatively associated with Effort
on Task Under Contract (-.20, p < .01). The combination of these paths demonstrates that
Effort on Task Under Contract is higher under a penalty contract than under a bonus
contract.
Path analysis also shows that the effect of Contract Frame on Reciprocal Trust
occurs through Perceived Fairness. Perceived Fairness is positively associated with
Perceived Trust (.21, p < .01). Perceived Trust is positively associated with Reciprocal
Trust (.66, p < .01). The combination of these two paths shows that Perceived Trust is
lower (higher) under a penalty (bonus) contract frame than under a bonus (penalty)
contract frame.
In sum, the interaction between contract frame and principal discretion impacts
the perceived fairness of the contract. Principal discretion has a significant positive effect
on perceived fairness only under a penalty contract. The results also show that principal
discretion eliminates the differences in perceived fairness between a bonus contract and a
penalty contract.
Also, effort on a task under a penalty contract is higher than effort on a task under
a bonus contract. Contrary to prior research, the higher effort under a penalty contract is a
result of how agents view the perceived fairness of their contract rather than through the
effect of expected disappointment (Hannan et al. 2005).
Results also show that a penalty contract has a negative effect on the trust
environment and this effect lowers perceived trust and reciprocal trust. In contrast to
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prior research, the negative effect of a penalty contract occurs through how agents view
the fairness of their contract rather than through the signaling effect found in Christ et al.
(2012).

Summary of Results
This section discusses the results of the test of the hypotheses and the results of
the path analysis. The results of the test of the hypotheses are listed in the following
table:
Table 16: Summary of Results of Tests of Hypotheses

H1:

H2:

H3:

H4:

Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under
Contract
Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a
penalty contract than under a bonus contract.

Supported

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent
Effort for Task Under Contract
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate Not
the relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the Supported
task under contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus)
contract will be lower (higher) with principal discretion than
without principal discretion.
Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under
Contract
Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a
bonus contract than under a penalty contract.

Not
Supported

Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent
Effort for Task Not Under Contract
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate Not
the relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the Supported
task not under contract such that agent effort under a penalty
(bonus) contract will be lower (higher) with principal discretion
than without principal discretion.
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Agent effort on the task under contract was significantly greater in the penalty
contract condition than in the bonus contract condition. This result supports Hypothesis
1.
Agent effort on the task under contract in the penalty contract/principal discretion
condition was not significantly lower than in the penalty contract/no principal discretion
condition. Also, agent effort on the task under contract in the bonus contract/principal
discretion condition was not significantly higher than in the bonus contract/no principal
discretion condition. These results do not support Hypothesis 2.
Agent effort on the task not under contract was not significantly greater in the
bonus contract condition than in the penalty contract condition. Hypothesis 3 is not
supported.
Agent effort on the task not under contract was not significantly lower in the
penalty contract/principal discretion condition than in the penalty contract/no principal
discretion condition. Also, agent effort on the task not under contract was not
significantly higher in the bonus contract/principal discretion condition than in the bonus
contract/no principal discretion condition. These results do not support Hypothesis 4.
Structural equations-based path analysis of the complete model (see Figure 9)
shows that the interaction between contract frame and principal discretion affects
perceived fairness. Further analysis of the model indicates that effort for a task under
contract is higher under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract. Also, perceived
trust and reciprocal trust are lower under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract.
The contribution of these results is discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6

Summary

Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a summary of the results and discusses their implications
and limitations. Section 6.2 summarizes the research questions and the findings of the
study. Section 6.3 explains the limitations of the study. Section 6.4 suggests areas for
future research.

Summary and Implications
6.2.1

Summary
The design of incentive compensation plans is critical to a company’s success.

An incentive contract can be framed as either a bonus that rewards agents for achieving
certain performance goals or as a penalty that decreases compensation if agents fail to
meet performance goals. The effect of bonuses and penalties on agent effort remains
unclear because prior research shows varied results that depend not only on the
contractual setting but also on how effort is measured. In a contract setting without
principal discretion, agent effort on a task under contract was higher under penalty
contracts than under bonus contracts (Hannan et al. 2005). However, in a contract setting
with principal discretion, bonus contracts induce greater effort than penalty contracts on a
subsequent task not under contract (Christ et al. 2012). A number of differences between
these two studies exist that make the results difficult to compare.
This study combines the two models from prior literature to examine the means
by which incentive contract framing affects effort. This study uses an experiment to vary
both the incentive contract frame and the two contract settings within the same study.
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This study then examines the effect of this manipulation on the two different effort
measures. As a result, this study addresses the need to understand the underlying
mechanisms for how incentive contract framing affects agent effort.
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation is commonly used with
incentive contracts in practice. Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation
means that principals use subjective judgment rather than objective measures to assess
agent performance. Prior research suggests that principal discretion can have either
positive or negative effects on agent effort. Principal discretion may increase agent effort
because principal discretion reduces compensation risk and improves incentive alignment
(Bol 2008). Alternatively, principal discretion may decrease agent effort because
principal discretion may introduce bias that can blur the link between pay and
performance (Bol 2008; Bol et al. 2011).
The joint effect of incentive contract frame and principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation on agent effort, however, has not been studied. The question
remains as to whether the effect of principal discretion on agent effort varies according to
the contract frame. This study uses the new model to examine whether and how incentive
contract framing and principal discretion interact to impact agent effort. This study
predicts that agents will interpret the use of principal discretion in agent performance
evaluation differently under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract and that their
interpretation will affect their effort.
This study, however, does not find the predicted interaction of incentive contract
frame and principal discretion on agent effort. Specifically, the use of the penalty
contract (bonus) contract frame with principal discretion did not lead to a significantly
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lower (higher) level of effort than the use of the penalty (bonus) contract frame without
principal discretion. Not finding the expected interaction may be due to a weak measure
for effort. Therefore, the lack of results due to a weak measure would not necessarily
affect finding other results.
Importantly, this study finds an interaction between principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation and contract frame. Results of an experiment show that the
interaction of principal discretion and contract frame influences how agents view the
perceived fairness of their incentive contract. Specifically, principal discretion increases
perceived fairness under a penalty contract frame but not under a bonus contract frame.
The results of this study also show that the use of principal discretion eliminates the
differences in perceived fairness between a bonus contract and a penalty contract.
This results of this study suggest that the use of principal discretion in agent
evaluation is more important when an outcome is unfavorable than when an outcome is
favorable. Under a favorable outcome such as a bonus contract, people are less likely to
seek additional information to make sense of their situation because the situation is
favorable. When an outcome is unfavorable such as a penalty contract, people seek
additional information to make sense of their situation. The level of procedural fairness
provides information that can make sense of the situation. Principal discretion can
improve procedural fairness because principals can use their discretion to adjust for the
effects of uncontrollable events. Principal discretion then improves perceived fairness
especially under an unfavorable outcome such as a penalty contract.
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This study also extends prior research by showing that perceived fairness is
critical for understanding how incentive contract frame affects effort and trust. The
results of this study suggest that perceived fairness explains how contract frame affects
effort across the different contract settings of the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al.
(2012) models. Specifically, perceived fairness provides not only the primary link
between contract frame and effort on a task under contract in Hannan et al. (2005) but
also the primary link between contract frame and trust in Christ et al. (2012).
The results of this study document that perceived fairness is the primary path by
which contract frame affects effort on a task under contract. The study finds that effort on
a task under contract was greater under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract.
The primary path by which this occurs, however, is not expected disappointment (Hannan
et al. 2005) but perceived fairness. Perceived fairness is lower under a penalty contract
than under a bonus contract. Effort on the task under contract is negatively associated
with perceived fairness. The results suggest that the unfairness of the penalty contract
increases the desire to avoid paying the penalty. This increased desire to avoid paying the
penalty results in higher effort on the task under a penalty contract than under a bonus
contract.
The results of this study also show that perceived fairness is the primary path by
which contract frame affects trust. The study finds that perceived trust is higher under a
bonus contract than under a penalty contract. The primary path by which this occurs,
however, is not the signaling path of Christ et al. (2012) but the path of perceived
fairness. Perceived fairness is higher under a bonus contract. Perceived trust is
positively associated with perceived fairness. The results of this study, then, show that
91

perceived fairness explains not only how contract frame affects effort on the task under
contract but also how contract frame affects trust.

6.2.2

Implications
Improving how agents view contracts is important for managers who design and

implement incentive contracts. These results suggest that principal discretion in agent
performance evaluation offsets the perceived lack of fairness of penalty contracts.
Increasing the perceived fairness of penalty contracts will help managers to design better
incentive compensation plans.
The results of this study contribute to the incentive contract framing literature by
documenting that principal discretion in agent performance evaluation changes the
perceived unfairness of penalty contracts. Prior literature shows that agents view bonus
contracts as fairer than penalty contracts (Hannan et al. 2005). However, this study
shows that the use of principal discretion increases the perceived fairness of a penalty
contract to nearly the same level as a bonus contract.
The results of this study also contribute to a second stream of literature that
examines principal discretion in agent performance evaluation. This literature documents
various benefits and costs of principal discretion and generally focuses on the principal’s
decision to use discretion. By contrast, the results of this study show the effects of
principal discretion on agents. Specifically, the results show that principal discretion in
agent performance evaluation could significantly reduce the differences in perceived
fairness between a bonus contract and a penalty contract.
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Limitations of the Study
The study used a computerized laboratory setting that was designed to improve
the study’s internal validity. This setting, however, creates several potential limitations
regarding the study’s external validity.
The first limitation to generalizability is the use of student participants. Student
participants may react differently than employees who are have prior experience with
contracts or principal discretion in agent performance evaluation. A second threat to
external validity is the process used to introduce principal discretion. The process takes
place anonymously so that participants are not permitted contact with the principal. The
experiment did this to control for reputation effects that are outside the scope of this
study. A third limitation is that the financial incentives for the study are not in proportion
to financial incentives found in a real world setting. The pay incentives were designed to
be consistent with past research (Christ et al. 2012) so that insights from this study could
be interpreted incrementally.
In conclusion, this study is not designed to be directly generalizable to a real
world incentive compensation context. The contribution of the study is to show the
effects of manipulating only the use of principal discretion in agent performance
evaluation and incentive contract frame on agent perceived fairness.

Future Research Directions
The results of this study suggest several avenues for future research. First, the
study did not find the expected effect of the interaction between principal discretion in
agent performance evaluation and contract frame on agent effort for a task under contract.
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The measure for effort on the task under contract did not provide enough variance to
measure effort for the task under a contract. Future research could determine whether
and how an interaction between principal discretion and contract frame affects agent
effort on the task under contract by improving the measure used to determine the effort
on the task under contract.
Second, the study was not able to determine whether an interaction between
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation and contract frame affects effort for
the task not under contract. Loss aversion may have contributed to the mixed results.
Future research could determine whether and how an interaction between principal
discretion and contract frame affects agent effort for a task not under contract by
exploring other kinds of tasks not under contract.
Third, this study employed an experiment with a single period. Although the
results show that principal discretion improves agent perceived fairness of a penalty
contract, it is unclear whether this benefit would continue if the principal and agents
engaged in a multi-period experiment. Future research could examine whether the joint
effect of principal discretion and incentive contract frame continues to influence agent
perceived fairness even after the principal responds to the agent in the next period.
Finally, the study introduced principal discretion with the use of an ex-post
adjustment to an objective performance measure. However, prior literature suggests that
other types of principal discretion are common in practice (Hoppe and Moers 2011).
Future research could explore whether different kinds of principal discretion would have
the same effect found in the current study.
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Appendix A: Experimental Materials
Part 1 Instructions

DECISION MAKING STUDY

Please do not use your browser's back button at any time.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

INSTRUCTIONS
General
You are about to participate in a study on decision making. Please read the instructions
carefully because the amount of money you earn will depend in part on your
decisions. Also there will be several short quizzes on these instructions to ensure your
understanding, and you will not be able to continue until you accurately complete the
quizzes, so please pay close attention.
Please turn off cell phones and similar devices now.
Please do not talk at all during this experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the Administrator will answer
you in private.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Overview of the Study
This is a computerized decision making study. We expect the entire session to last
approximately 60 minutes, during which time you will be required to answer questions
and make decisions.
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In this study, you will assume the role of Participant A. You will be matched with
someone else in the room who will assume the role of Participant B. You will not be told
who you are paired with either during or after the study.
You will earn points which can be affected by decisions made by you and/or the person
with whom you are paired. These points will be converted to cash and you will be paid
the cash amount before you leave today. Points will be converted to cash using the
following formula:
US $ Payment = (Points earned x .025).




If you earn 200 points, you will receive US $5.00
If you earn 500 points, you will receive US $12.50
If you earn 1000 points, you will receive US $25.00

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Bonus No Discretion Instructions
Initial Decisions
Overview
As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.
More specifically, at the start of the study,



You will be given 850 points and
Participant B will be given 250 points.

Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B
will receive the returns from the investments.
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and
Participant B.
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Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Your Task
You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments. You will be presented with
30 possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for
1 share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns
will be maximized if you select the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest
returns in the next period.
NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each
of these investments.

Please click the "Next" button to continue

There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments. The
cost per share depends on the investment type.



Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.
Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.

WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average
return of 50 points per share.
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after
you have read the information on the laminated document.
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system in
which you will receive an extra 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen by you
is greater than or equal to 500 points. You will not receive any bonus points if the total
return is less than 500 points. The bonus will be paid from the administrator's fund. That
is, the bonus will not be deducted from Participant B's fund.
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After Participant B decides whether or not to implement a control system, you will be
notified of this decision.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Your Summary of Points
You will receive an initial fund of 850 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total
return of the shares chosen by you. Thus the payoffs to you for this initial decision are as
follows:
No Control System

Control System

Total Share
Returns
< 500

850 points - Cost of
Shares

850 points - Cost of Shares

Total Share
Returns
>=500

850 points - Cost of
Shares

850 points - Cost of Shares + 150
bonus points

For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares. Also assume that the returns for these investments
equal or exceed 500 points. Your payoff will equal 850 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) + 150 = 840
points.
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments
are less than 500, your payoff will equal 850 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) = 690 points.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Participant B
Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system for
you.
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If Participant B chooses to implement a control system, the cost to Participant B is 50
points.

Summary of Points - Participant B
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control
system. Thus the payoffs to Participant B are as follows:

Total Share
Returns < 500
Total Share
Returns >=500

No Control
System

Control System

250 points + total
share returns

250 points + total share returns - 50
points for cost of control system
250 points + total share returns - 50
points for cost of control system

250 points + total
share returns

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
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Bonus No Discretion Choose Investments
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds.
While you are waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations
of the investment histories for the possible investments.
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that provides you with a 150-point bonus if
your investments yield a return >= 500 points.
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30
investments. Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 choices using the provided paper and
pencil.
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.
When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.
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Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When
you are finished, please click the "Next" button.
BELL (10 points each)
Investment Project A
Investment Project B
Investment Project C
Investment Project D
Investment Project E
Investment Project F
Investment Project G
Investment Project H
Investment Project I
Investment Project J
Investment Project K
Investment Project L
Investment Project M
Investment Project N
Investment Project O

WHISTLE (25 points each)
Investment Project P
Investment Project Q
Investment Project R
Investment Project S
Investment Project T
Investment Project U
Investment Project V
Investment Project W
Investment Project X
Investment Project Y
Investment Project Z
Investment Project AA
Investment Project BB
Investment Project CC
Investment Project DD
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Bonus Discretion Instructions
Initial Decisions
Overview

As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.

More specifically, at the start of the study,



You will be given 850 points and
Participant B will be given 250 points.

Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B
will receive the returns from the investments.

The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and
Participant B.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Your Task

You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments. You will be presented with 30
possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for 1
share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns
will be maximized if you select the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest
returns in the next period.

102

NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each
of these investments.
Please click the "Next" button to continue.

There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments. The
cost per share depends on the investment type.



Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.
Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.

WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average
return of 50 points per share.

Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).

Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after
you have read the information on the laminated document.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system for
you in which you will receive an extra 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen
by you meets or exceeds the performance target set by Participant B (between 400 600 points). You will not receive any bonus points if the total return is less than the
performance target set by Participant B. The bonus will be paid from the administrator's
fund. That is, the bonus will not be deducted from Participant B's fund.
After Participant B decides whether or not to implement a control system, you will be
notified of this decision.
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Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Your Summary of Points
You will receive an initial fund of 850 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total
return of the shares chosen by you. Thus the payoffs to you for this initial decision are as
follows:

No Control
System

Control System

Total Share Returns < Target set by
Participant B (between 400 - 600
points)

850 points Cost of Shares

850 points - Cost of
Shares

Total Share Returns >= Target set
by Participant B (between 400 - 600
points)

850 points Cost of Shares

850 points - Cost of
Shares + 150 bonus
points

For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares. Also assume that the returns for these investments
equal or exceed the performance target set by Participant B. Your payoff will equal 850 (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) + 150 = 840 points.

If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments
are less than the performance target set by Participant B, your payoff will equal 850 - (6 x
10) - (4 x 25) = 690 points.
Please click the "Next" button to continue.
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Participant B

Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system for
you.
If Participant B chooses to implement a control system, the cost to Participant B is 50
points

Summary of Points - Participant B
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control
system. Thus, the payoffs to Participant B are as follows:
No Control
System

Control System

Total Share Returns < Target
set by Participant B (between
400 - 600 points)

250 points +
total share
returns

250 points + total share
returns - 50 points for cost
of control system

Total Share Returns >= Target
set by Participant B (between
400 - 600 points)

250 points +
total share
returns

250 points + total share
returns - 50 points for cost
of control system

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
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Bonus Discretion Choose Investments
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds.

While you are waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations
of the investment histories for the possible investments.

Participant B HAS imposed a control system that provides you with a 150-point bonus if
your investments yield a return >= the performance target set by Participant B (between
400 - 600 points).
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30
investments. Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 choices using the provided paper and
pencil.
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.
When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.
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Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When
you are finished, please click the "Next" button.

BELL (10 points each)
Investment Project A
Investment Project B
Investment Project C
Investment Project D
Investment Project E
Investment Project F
Investment Project G
Investment Project H
Investment Project I
Investment Project J
Investment Project K
Investment Project L
Investment Project M
Investment Project N
Investment Project O

WHISTLE (25 points each)
Investment Project P
Investment Project Q
Investment Project R
Investment Project S
Investment Project T
Investment Project U
Investment Project V
Investment Project W
Investment Project X
Investment Project Y
Investment Project Z
Investment Project AA
Investment Project BB
Investment Project CC
Investment Project DD
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Penalty No Discretion Instructions
Initial Decisions
Overview
As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.
More specifically, at the start of the study,



You will be given 1000 points and
Participant B will be given 250 points.

Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B
will receive the returns from the investments.
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and
Participant B.
Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Your Task
You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments. You will be presented with
30 possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for
1 share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns
will be maximized if you selects the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest
returns in the next period.
NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each
of these investments.
Please click the "Next" button to continue.

There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments. The
cost per share depends on the investment type.



Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.
Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.
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WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average
return of 50 points per share.
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after
you have read the information on the laminated document.
Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a penalty
system in which you will pay 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen by you is
less than 500 points. You will not have to pay any penalty points if the total return is
greater than or equal to 500 points. The penalty will be paid to the administrator's fund.
That is, the penalty will not be added to Participant B's fund.
After Participant B decides whether or not to implement a control system, you will be
notified of this decision.
Please click the "Next" button to continue.
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Your Summary of Points
You will receive an initial fund of 1000 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total
return of the shares chosen by you. Thus the payoffs to you for this initial decision are as
follows:
No Control System

Control System

Total Share Returns
< 500

1000 points - Cost of
Shares

1000 points - Cost of Shares - 150
penalty points

Total Share Returns >=
500

1000 points - Cost of
Shares

1000 points - Cost of Shares

For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares. Also assume that the returns for these investments
are less than 500 points. Your payoff will equal 1000 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) - 150 = 690
points.
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments
equal or exceeds 500 points, your payoff will equal 1000 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) = 840
points.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Participant B
Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a penalty
system for you.
If Participant B chooses to implement a control system, the cost to Participant B is 50
points.
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Summary of Points - Participant B
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control
system. Thus the payoffs to Participant B are as follows:
No Control
System

Control System

Total Share
Returns < 500

250 points + total
share returns

250 points + total share returns - 50
points for cost of control system

Total Share
Returns >=500

250 points + total
share returns

250 points + total share returns - 50
points for cost of control system

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Penalty No Discretion Choose Investments
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds. While you are
waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations of the
investment histories for the possible investments.
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that penalizes you 150 points if your
investments yield a return < 500 points.
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30
investments. Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 selections using the provided paper
and pencil.
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.
When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.
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Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When
you are finished, please click the "Next" button.

BELL (10 points each)
Investment Project A
Investment Project B
Investment Project C
Investment Project D
Investment Project E
Investment Project F
Investment Project G
Investment Project H
Investment Project I
Investment Project J
Investment Project K
Investment Project L
Investment Project M
Investment Project N
Investment Project O

WHISTLE (25 points each)
Investment Project P
Investment Project Q
Investment Project R
Investment Project S
Investment Project T
Investment Project U
Investment Project V
Investment Project W
Investment Project X
Investment Project Y
Investment Project Z
Investment Project AA
Investment Project BB
Investment Project CC
Investment Project DD
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Penalty Discretion Instructions
Initial Decisions
Overview
As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.
More specifically, at the start of the study,



You will be given 1000 points and
Participant B will be given 250 points.

Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B
will receive the returns from the investments.
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and
Participant B.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Your Task
You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments. You will be presented with
30 possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for
1 share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns
will be maximized if you select the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest
returns in the next period.
NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each
of these investments.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
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There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments. The
cost per share depends on the investment type.



Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.
Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.

WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average
return of 50 points per share.
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after
you have read the information on the laminated document.
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement the control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system establishes a penalty system for you in which
you will pay 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen by you is less than
the performance target set by Participant B (between 400 - 600 points). You will not
have to pay any penalty points if the total return is greater than or equal to the
performance target set by Participant B. The penalty will be paid to the administrator's
fund. That is, the penalty will not be added to Participant B's fund.
After Participant B decides to implement the control system, you will be notified of this
decision.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
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Your Summary of Points
You will receive an initial fund of 1000 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total
return of the shares chosen by you. Thus the payoffs to you for this initial decision are as
follows:
No Control System

Control System

Total Share Returns < Target set by
Participant B
(between 400 - 600 points)

1000 points - Cost
of Shares

1000 points - Cost of Shares 150 penalty points

Total Share Returns >= Target set
by Participant B
(between 400 - 600 points)

1000 points - Cost
of Shares

1000 points - Cost of Shares

For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares. Also assume that the returns for these investments
are less than the performance target set by Participant B. Your payoff will equal 1000 (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) - 150 = 690 points.
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments
equal or exceed the performance target set by Participant B, your payoff will equal 1000 (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) = 840 points.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Participant B
Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a penalty
system for you.
If Participant B chooses to implement a control system, the cost to Participant B is 50
points.
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Summary of Points - Participant B
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control
system. Thus the payoffs to Participant B are as follows:
No Control
System

Control System

Total Share Returns < Target
set by Participant B (between
400 - 600 points)

250 points +
total share
returns

250 points + total share
returns - 50 points for cost
of control system

Total Share Returns >= Target
set by Participant B (between
400 - 600 points)

250 points +
total share
returns

250 points + total share
returns - 50 points for cost
of control system

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Penalty Discretion Choose Investments
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds. While you are
waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations of the
investment histories for the possible investments.
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that penalizes you 150 points if your
investments yield < the performance target set by Participant B (between 400 - 600
points).
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30
investments. Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 selections using the provided paper
and pencil.
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.
When you are ready, please click the "Next" button.
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Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When
you are finished, please click the "Next" button.
BELL (10 points each)
Investment Project A
Investment Project B
Investment Project C
Investment Project D
Investment Project E
Investment Project F
Investment Project G
Investment Project H
Investment Project I
Investment Project J
Investment Project K
Investment Project L
Investment Project M
Investment Project N
Investment Project O

WHISTLE (25 points each)
Investment Project P
Investment Project Q
Investment Project R
Investment Project S
Investment Project T
Investment Project U
Investment Project V
Investment Project W
Investment Project X
Investment Project Y
Investment Project Z
Investment Project AA
Investment Project BB
Investment Project CC
Investment Project DD
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Task 2 Instructions

CONTINUING DECISIONS

Overview
You are still in the same role.
In addition, you are paired with the same person. The identification of participants will
continue to be anonymous throughout the study.
You will start this part with whatever points you have in your fund following the prior set
of decisions. (Note that you do not know the amount exactly, because we have not told
you the returns from the shares you have selected. However, you still have a minimum of
600 points with which to make investments.)
You will now have the opportunity to earn more points based on the choices made by you
and the person with whom you are paired.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Your Task

You now have the task of deciding on one additional investment for Participant B. This
investment decision is different from the prior investment decisions in several important
ways:
There is only one type of investment: a HORN investment.
Each HORN share costs 10 points (whereas in prior decisions, some investments cost 10
points and some cost 25 points).
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The return per share in the next period is known to be 30 points (whereas in the prior
decisions, the return per share in the next period was unknown and had to be predicted
based on the history of past returns).
You can purchase anywhere from 0 to 50 shares of the HORN investment (whereas in the
prior decisions, you could only select one share each of 10 different investments).
Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio. However, Participant B will have
the opportunity to share the return from the investment with you (whereas in the prior
decisions, Participant B kept the total return).

Please click the "Next" button to continue.
Participant B

After learning how many shares you have purchased, Participant B will be given the
opportunity to pay any amount of the return to you. Remember that Participant B will
earn 30 points for each HORN share that you purchase.

After Participant B earns the return, Participant B will decide how much of the total
return to give back to you. Participant B can return to you anything from 0 to the total
amount.

Please click the "Next" button to continue.

Task 2 Treatment
You have at least 600 points remaining from Part 1.

You can now purchase between 0 - 50 shares of the HORN Investment. Each share of
HORN Investment will cost you 10 points.
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Each share of the HORN Investment automatically returns 30 points. Participant B will
earn all of the returns from the shares of HORN Investment that you buy.

However, Participant B can share any amount of the returns with you.

Please move the slider along the bar below with your mouse to indicate how many shares
of the HORN investment you would like to buy. After you are finished, please click the
"Next" button.
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